Saturday, April 4, 2009

Paper of Understanding - 3 years on (Feb 2006-09)

===================================================================


3 years on (2006 - 2009)

Mohamad Shmaysani -

Three years ago, a phenomenal event took place in a significant place one year after a catastrophic incident that put the country on the verge of war...civil war.

On the 6th of February 2006, Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah and the head of the Free Patriotic Movement General Michel Aoun signed a memorandum of understanding at the Saint Michael church, a symbol for the civil war era when the church and the adjacent “green line” used to separate between Muslim and Christian fighters in western and eastern Beirut. The event took place almost a year after former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in Beirut; an incident that split the Lebanese and pushed the country to the verge of a new civil war.

THE RIOTS OF FEBRUARY 5


Lebanon was divided between the March 8 and the March 14 blocs.

The ambitions of the Christians had shattered after the so called “Cedars Revolution” monopolized power and turned against its allies.

The peak was on the eve of the 5th of February 2006, one day before the MOU was signed.

Then Interior Minister Hasan Sabaa, had held a security meeting and announced afterwards that a demonstration will take place outside the Danish embassy in Ashrafiyyeh. He also said that the orders were not to confront the demonstrators. Sabaa also banned the use of live bullet rounds by police in the area.

The morning of February 5 saw the destruction of private and public properties including churches and the torching of the some building near the embassy. The head of the Lebanese Forces Samir Geagea urged his supporters through media outlets not to face the demonstrators, given the fact they are allied from the Mustakbal (Future) movement of MP Saad Hariri.

The riot and the havoc continued for several hours. Geagea had to retreat his morning statement with another calling on Sabaa to resign.

The Future Movement was still silent.

The interior ministry announced later in the evening that police had arrested 160 rioters. Most of them were later released under a “special pardon” and pressure by the Future Movement.


MOU RESULTS IN NEW REALITY OF COEXISTENCE

The MOU however, resulted in a new reality of Lebanese coexistence. Christians in Ashrafiyyeh realized that it was the first time that the performance of allies (Future – Lebanese Forces) causes that much damage.

It was not before the historical event that most of the Lebanese really felt that civil war in Lebanon was over. The MOU introduced a patriotic model of a freewill agreement, between different political groups, on a project to build a society and a strong, capable and fair state for free compatriots.

THE UNDERSTANDING SURMOUNTS CHALLENGES


The first was the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006. After the resistance captured the two Israeli soldiers, Aoun said Hezbollah had engaged in a “pure military action,” not a terrorist attack, at a time so called moderates inside and outside Lebanon were slamming the resistance as a group of adventurers. Hezbollah took over defending Lebanon militarily while Aoun, a former army commander, backed the resistance politically and socially, when his supporters shared their houses, food and clothes with their displaced compatriots.

Aoun’s MOU with Hezbollah has always been dangerous for Israel and the United States. The General himself, according to intelligence reports, was a main target for Israeli warplanes during the war.

Like Hezbollah, Aoun also earned the ire of Israel and Washington by publicly calling for the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to their homeland Palestine in the framework of their right to return, something strongly resisted by Israel.

The second challenge emerged right after the 33-day war ended; this time with an illegitimate government. Hezbollah, the FPM and other opposition parties held a 537-day sit-in in downtown Beirut to demand the government step down and improve living conditions in Lebanon.

Then came the 7th of June 2008. On that day, zero hour was set to embark in an action aimed at distorting the image of the resistance. The understanding between Hezbollah and the FPM prevented the bid to take the country into the abyss. The anti-resistance attempt backlashed.
When feuding parties returned from Qatar after having agreed on a set of long waited measures, a government was formed and Aoun’s party was part of it.

The Hezbollah-FPM understanding is no longer an understanding between two wide popular movements, but is has become a social method to enhance confidence and hope and to build a prosperous, indivisible Lebanon immune from occupation or appropriation.

It is an understanding that constitutes a much needed entrance to any broader national understanding.

http://forum.tayyar.org/901304-post1.html



MoU between FPM/HA 3 years on - Special report:

Part 1: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wymyNk7olTs&feature=related
Part 2: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f2gDjtY1nWE&feature=related
Part 3: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ljcz10RuHpg&feature=related
Part 4: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mQUzitihL6I&feature=related
Part 5: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eEEL9TDIsV8&feature=related
Part 6: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YFbn-7RWq0c&feature=related

Video of Feb 5, 2006 Riots - Special report:

(4 parts. In order)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ppnia5KaYM&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=os0XuWjLyeg&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ezh3JOd9Bw0&feature=channel
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T2eUZyMd34w&feature=related




===================================================================


2 years on (2006-08):

Nasrallah-Aoun: Putting a face to the other
Hanady Salman* writes from Beirut on a tale of two Lebanons

http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/884/re10.htm

It was an event that this country has never witnessed before. Not that the country has not witnessed many unique events in its history.

However, on 6 February 2008, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah, and the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, Michel Aoun, appeared on television together to explain the "Agreement of Understanding" they had signed two years before. Watching the two men, who differ on almost every issue, sitting together, talking to each other, and, mostly, listening to each other, is an unprecedented sight in Lebanon.

Nasrallah is a sheikh and a Shia sayed, or descendant of the prophet. He grew up in a poor Christian neighbourhood that he had to leave with his family when the Lebanese Civil War started in the mid-1970s.

He moved between South Lebanon, Baalbak, Najaf in Iraq, and Qom in Iran for a while, studied Islam, became a sheikh, fought the Israelis in the south during the 1982 invasion, and was one of the founders of an organisation that grew to force Israel out of Lebanon in 2000 and defeat the main goal of the deadly war it launched in July 2006, namely to destroy Hizbullah.

When Nasrallah was born in 1960, Michel Aoun was training to become a lieutenant in the Lebanese army he had joined in 1955. Aoun was born in 1935 to a lower-middle-class family that struggled to pay his tuition fees at the prestigious Freres School. The Civil War drove him out of the neighbourhood of Haret Hreik in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the same neighbourhood that Hizbullah chose some decades later for its headquarters.

Aoun learnt French, English, Spanish and Italian. During his military career, he travelled to many Western countries, where he spent considerable amounts of time training, mostly in France and the US. His daughters grew up in upper-middle-class Lebanese circles.

In 1984, when Nasrallah was fighting the Israelis in South Lebanon, Aoun became commander-in-chief of the Lebanese army. And in 1990, when the Syrians led Aoun out of the country, Hizbullah was preparing to join the Lebanese parliament and become a "legal" and established component of the country's political scene.

During the 15 years Aoun spent in exile in France, Nasrallah's presence on the Lebanese scene grew in prominence and popularity. In 1992, he was elected secretary-general of Hizbullah; in 1997, his elder son Hadi was killed during a battle with the Israelis in South Lebanon; in 2000, Lebanon celebrated the Israeli withdrawal, mostly thanks to Hizbullah's efforts. The man himself, though, was confined to a sort of self-imposed house arrest in the southern suburbs of Beirut for security reasons.

During the same 15 years, Aoun founded the Free Patriotic Movement and lobbied for Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in international circles. This was the same Syrian presence that facilitated Nasrallah's accomplishments back home.

These are two men who lived in a country where they were never supposed to meet, not even accidentally. They would not even walk on the same streets, meet the same people, speak the same language in their homes, go to the same restaurants, or shop at the same places. They don't even have the same accent.

People with different backgrounds are not supposed to meet in Lebanon. You can grow up in Beirut, visit Paris 300 times, and die before you even think of seeing [the northern province of] Akkar. And you can live and die in Bint Jbeil in the South, and spend your whole life cherishing the memory of the only visit you ever paid to Baalbak in the Bekaa.

This separation is not about different religious or political backgrounds. Rich Christians and rich Muslims are "best friends". Their kids go to the same schools, wear the same brands, ski together, and spend summers in the same countries. Their wives carry the same three-figure price-tagged bags, go to the same beauty parlours, and fancy the same luxurious restaurants. And the men like doing business together, keeping the money in the same circles, lobbying together to keep things the way they are.

Only poor Lebanese never meet in this country. The Christian neighbourhood of Ain Al-Rumaneh is just one street away from the Shia neighbourhood of Shayyah. This is a deadly street and one that witnessed the ugliest atrocities of the Civil War. This is a street that regularly witnesses clashes between people living on both sides.

Yet, families on both sides never get to know how similar they are: all struggling lower-middle-class families who can barely make ends meet. Their bitterness, their anger, goes in the wrong direction. For "the Other" is not someone who lives differently. The Other is someone who is very similar to themselves.

It was on this street that Nasrallah and Aoun met publicly two years ago and announced they had decided to join efforts to achieve common goals, at least to achieve the goals they both have in common. Neither man asked the other to change radically. Neither ignored how different the other was.

Back then, most people in the country thought it was a bad joke, or at best a tactical move to embarrass opponents. However, no one then knew that this move would have to face a cruel test in the shape of a war that in few weeks left at least 1,200 people dead, one million displaced, and a country half destroyed and totally divided.

No one believed the agreement would withstand such a test.

Yet, Aoun's followers opened their houses to Nasrallah's followers fleeing the Israeli fire and destruction. In these houses, both sides came to see how similar they were: the Other had a face now, a name, a few kids, tears and smiles.

Putting a face to the Other was what it was.

Regardless of what Aoun and Nasrallah represent politically, these are two men who have come a long way. Like few before them, they each decided to give up a little, to find common ground, and to take it from there. They say their ultimate goal is to build a country where the citizen is king. This is what they explicitly said last Wednesday.

Nasrallah said he will never "want to establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon and disturb its diversity, which is the same diversity that allows" him to be what he wants to be. Aoun said that he wants a country of equal citizens.

This is a first, and not only in Lebanon. Leaders who want the citizen to be king?

Well, today at least in Lebanon two leaders went on record to announce that the concept of citizenship, with all that it entails, had found a tiny place on their busy agendas.


=========================================================


Sayyed Nasrallah, General Aoun: Understanding Strong

Mohamad Shmaysani

07/02/2008

Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah and the head of the Free Patriotic Movement MP General Michel Aoun joined together for a special interview Wednesday night on Orange TV. Both leaders were marking the second anniversary of the Memorandum of understanding which they signed in the Mar Mekhayel Church in the southern suburb of Beirut. Colleague Jean Aziz who hosted Sayyed Nasrallah and General Aoun asked about their first contact. “My first contact with General Aoun was in September 1997. He spoke to me on telephone and offered his condolences for the martyrdom of my son (Hadi). However the first political contact between Hezbollah and the FPM had been made in different times,” Sayyed Nasrallah said. The last time I sat with Sayyed Nasrallah was in last November,” General Aoun said.

Both Leaders had their say about many issues, including the arms of the resistance, the recent incidents in Mar Mekhayel on the Black Sunday, the Arab initiative and the understanding between their parties.


RESISTANCE ARMS MAKE FEAR BALANCE WITH ISRAEL

Sayyed Nasrallah said that the arms in possession of Hezbollah are not arms of a militia. "It is the arms of the resistance that is characterized as such through the group that is carrying it. When the enemy is faced with these arms for a national cause like liberating occupied lands, then this is called 'arms of the resistance.' The Israeli army withdrew from most of our territories in 2000, there remained some occupied lands and there remained Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails. We have protected our border, people and villages with a balance of fear from 2000 till 2006," Sayyed Nasrallah said.

For his part, General Aoun said that the arms are to defend Lebanon. "Therefore, the arsenal is not to liberate the prisoners alone. These prisoners are the result of war and resistance and they constitute one of the battle's outcomes on the road to liberating the land," General Aoun said.
When asked about who would possess the decision of peace and war and what would the function of the arms of the resistance be when everything is over, the FPM chief said that these issues were to be included in a defensive strategy agreed upon by all Lebanese parties where it not for the war that froze everything.

Sayyed Nasrallah elaborated saying that the arms of the resistance were protecting the country until the 2006 war, "and as the war was blazing, they (ruling bloc) wanted to disarm us. The problem is not with the arms. Fix the problem that resulted in the existence of these arms. Here lies the importance of the understanding. It did not perceive the arms of the resistance as the problem, it said: protecting Lebanon its independence and sovereignty are a national obligation and responsibility that is guaranteed by international charters and the declaration of human rights particularly in the face of any threat o dangers. So we started from here: How do we protect the country? We agreed that there should be national dialogue to agree on a comprehensive defensive strategy. Of course there are some who are not interested in defending this country. A strong, capable and reassuring state protects its people; it does not conspire on them to kill them, wipe them out, eliminate them and cancel them. I was celebrating victory when I said that we do not want to keep our arms forever. These arms have a certain function. If someone other than us would come and assume this function and protect our people and this country, then we would be very satisfied because we have many other things to do," his eminence said.

General Aoun also said that "when we want to implement a defensive strategy along with the Lebanese government, the liberation of the Shebaa Farms and the prisoners in Israeli jails would have been accomplished. From that point forward, the arms would be controlled within resistance units, because the resistance is mainly dependent on the residents of border villages and based on military forces. We would then be in state of defense, not in the process of liberating lands. As long as there is a standing enemy, what's wrong with have a defensive system ready?" asked General Aoun.


RESISTANCE WANTS TO PREVENT WAR, YET READY FOR IT

Hezbollah's Secretary General said that going to war is dependent on many factors as well as regional and international circumstances. "It is also subject to the Israeli army's capability to fight another war and to the existence of a political leadership in Israel that would take the decision to go to war," Sayyed Nasrallah said. His eminence recalled one of his speeches in which he announced the possession of rockets that can target any spot in occupied Palestine and said that this was to express readiness and to prevent war. "After the issuance of the Winograd report many senior Israeli officers are saying that if Israel decided to go to war, it should take into account not only the displacement of Haifa, Akko and Tiberias residents but the lack of any safe spot in Israel as well. Israel needs war to enhance its deterrent capability. It will not go for a war it is not certain of its results. This is the margin that we have to make use of to prevent such war on Lebanon and its people," he added.

UNDERSTANDING ESTABLISHED INNER PEACE

General Aoun answered a question about what the memorandum of understanding between the Free Patriotic Movement and Hezbollah has achieved so far. "It accomplished something great," he said. "Perhaps this is the greatest accomplishment in Lebanon. It established the culture of understanding to build Lebanon, not a policy of fear from the other, confrontation with him and isolation in a religious cocoon. It also established social peace on the popular level. Nevertheless, the political competition remained. But the other side considered the memorandum a document of war. It was attacked regionally and internationally, we were engaged in media battles and we were accused of being part of an axis against another axis. I don't see any axis in the document. I only see an understanding among the Lebanese," General Aoun added.

This understanding established inner peace, it is a kernel for a broader national accord", Sayyed Nasrallah said. "When the incident of Mar Mekhayel happened on that black Sunday, they (February 14) were trying to say that the understanding had fallen apart, but we say that sedition was prevented because of this understanding and I do not mean the three-and-a-half page document but the work that was done during the past two years," his eminence added.

On the 27th of January, seven people were killed and fifty others were injured during demonstrations in the Mar Mekhayel region against electricity cut. Judiciary and military Investigations are still underway into the incident and Lebanese army officers and soldiers have been arrested.

"I would like to underscore the seriousness of the investigation and the removing any cover on any individual. Every incident has its circumstances, but this incident is different. I can assure you that we will follow up this case day and night. This is central to us and will remain so until the investigation reaches a conclusion and the people involved are accused and sentenced. This way, we would be protecting the country and creating agreement," Sayyed Nasrallah said.

On targeting the Lebanese army and the military institution, his eminence said that "I clearly and boldly say that we adhere to the military institution and we consider any assault against any officer or soldier to be an assault against the resistance and the martyrs of Mar Mekhayel."

Responding to media reports that the opposition would withdraw its support for the presidential candidacy of the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), General Michel Suleiman, over Black Sunday, Aoun said that so long as agreement was reached on the makeup of a new Cabinet and the terms of a new electoral law, Suleiman was still acceptable as a consensus candidate.

Sayyed Nasrallah agreed, adding that Suleiman needed to ensure a "swift and serious" investigation into Black Sunday in order to preserve both national unity and that of the LAF.
"Any attempt to evict the opposition from decision-making is unacceptable," Aoun added.
Hezbollah's Secretary General for his part insisted that two-thirds minority in any new government "is the mechanism that guarantees building trust" with the ruling bloc in Lebanon.

Arab League chief Amr Moussa was due to return to Beirut on Thursday after two previous mediation trips last month during which he proposed a three-point rescue plan.
The initiative calls for the election of army commander Gen. Michel Suleiman as president, the formation of a national unity government in which no one party has a veto power, and the adoption of a new electoral law.

Sayyed Nasrallah expressed support to every initiative to solve the ongoing political crisis in Lebanon. "I would like to quote something from the Winograd report: The strategic problem today in Israel is the lack of political leadership. And I say that the strategic problem in Lebanon today is the lack of trust," the Hezbollah chief said.

=========================================================


OTV Special Interview Marks Historic Understanding

Mohamad Shmaysani

05/02/2008

Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah and the head of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) MP General Michel Aoun are expected to launch a series of position when OTV (Orange TV) presenter Jean Aziz hosts them Wednesday night to mark the second anniversary of the signing of the Hezbollah – FPM memorandum of understanding. Both leaders will tackle the latest security incidents and political developments.

It was not before the historical signing of the Hezbollah – FPM memorandum of understanding that most of the Lebanese really felt that civil war in Lebanon was over. It was an understanding, the first such agreement in Lebanese history between a Muslim group and a Christian one. The understanding was signed on the 6th of February 2006 in the Mar Mekhayel church in the southern suburb of Beirut. The significance of the location is that this same church used to be one of the many indications to the separation between eastern Beirut and western Beirut during the civil war. "If it was not for this understanding, the country would have fallen into, perhaps, abyss because of what has been taking place in Lebanon and I mean on both security and political levels," said Mohamad Yussuf, a resident of the Chiyah area where the Mar Mekhayel Church is located.

The Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of MP General Michel Aoun and Hezbollah headed by Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah believe that the understanding resulted in a new reality of Lebanese coexistence. It also introduced a patriotic model of a freewill agreement, between different political groups, on a project to build a society and a strong, capable and fair state for free compatriots. The incidents that followed the signing of the understanding, particularly the most recent in the Mar Mekhayel region where 7 people were killed in spontaneous demonstrations over electricity blackout, proved the solidity of this choice, which established an atmosphere of national agreement and underlined real partnership and concurrent democracy based on clear fix standards. "What would have become of this country if things went out of control between Chiyah and Ain-el-Rommeneh? I'm sure another civil war would have started. This understanding prevented a new civil war from breaking out," said Yussuf.

The Hezbollah-FPM understanding is no longer an understanding between two wide popular movements, but it has become a social method to enhance confidence and hope and to build a prosperous, indivisible Lebanon immune from occupation or appropriation. It is an understanding that constitutes a much needed entrance to any broader national understanding.


=========================================================

Nasrallah and Aoun
February 8, 2008

nowlebanon.com

On February 6, the website of the Free Patriotic Movement carried excerpts of an interview broadcast by the movement's channel OTV with Deputy Michel Aoun and Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. During the interview, moderated by Jean Aziz, Aoun said that his last meeting with Nasrallah was in November 2007. Nasrallah also said that his first personal contact with Aoun was in September 1997, "when Aoun called me and extended his condolences for my son's martyrdom."

Nasrallah: The personal impression was always in isolation from the political conflict. [This personal impression] is that the General is an honest figure and on such a basis, we could establish our alliance and we could establish a country. We were not mistaken about this, and we had no comments about the General. The General's only problem is that he is national and national and national.

[Question about the prisoners in Syria]

Nasrallah: I followed up on this issue, and the brothers in Hezbollah followed up on it, too. The answer came from the Syrians themselves that these prisoners are not in Syria. The Syrians also asked for a committee to settle the issue of the lost people in both countries. This committee should be the specialty of the authority. They adopted the issue of the Palestinian weapons outside the camps in the dialogue sessions and they asked us – Speaker Berri and me – to resolve this crisis. We told them that “you are the authority, and we can help.” When Saad al-Hariri and Siniora met with Ahmad Jibril, their allies attacked them. The negotiator should be the authority, not me as a party or a movement. The authority should seek to find a solution.

Aoun: The [Lebanese] state should handle this issue with the [Syrian] state, and there should be an investigation about the issue of those kidnapped. This issue should be settled; those who were killed should be announced as dead, those who were kidnapped should be announced as kidnapped, and those who are imprisoned should return. This issue should have been resolved prior to the withdrawal of the Syrian regime.

Nasrallah: We can help, but the official side should shoulder this responsibility. The authority is concerned with this issue; it is not the General's or my responsibility. There are Iranians lost in Lebanon, but no one moved and followed up on this issue. Even for the hostages in the Israeli prisons, the authority doesn't move or carry out any actions. This issue should have an end, since it is a humanitarian issue.

Those in Israel [the Lebanese people who live in Israel] are categorized into two parts: The first part consists of those who are slightly involved, and the other part includes those involved in the killings. We did not kill any Lebanese person. The French resistance executed thousands of French people [who dealt with the enemy], but we did not do this. The judiciary prosecutes those who perpetrated big crimes.

Aoun: We arranged some lists, but there was a political immobilization. Prime Minister Fouad Siniora refused and hindered the return of those living in Israel. For example, the daughter of Akl Hashem was prosecuted in absentia for 15 years, and she left Lebanon when she was eight years old. This was a negative indication to intimidate them and never let them return.

Nasrallah: The party [Hezbollah] offered them reassurances, and the General should ask them to return, while the state should facilitate their return, which did not happen.

The Memorandum of Understanding is very clear. We want a state in which all the nation's constituents participate. Any Muslim person believes that the utmost justice is secured by an Islamic state; just as every secular person believe that the utmost justice is secured by a secular state.

Our vision for the Islamic regime is not imposed forcefully, especially in Lebanon, which is religiously divided. I cannot impose my decision. I am in front of two choices: either chaos or understanding. In Lebanon, the logic of majority and minority does not work. All Lebanese, namely the Christians, benefit from the consensual democracy, since any other choice damages and partitions the country. We agree that Lebanon is a message and a pattern and is the country of freedom. We are not seeking to change this reality, as this free reality suits us.

Aoun: As for consensual democracy, it is the period of pre-secularism. When we move from a certain political reality to another, we should be reassured. For example, the attempt to unite Europe forcefully failed, but then the regimes became stable, and when the country's entities were no longer threatened, unification seemed more feasible. Two years after this memorandum, we are highly reassured and comfortable, although the starting point differs between us. Relations should be between citizens and not between persons who belong to different sects. When we reach this stage, the person himself becomes more valuable.

I was in the opposition while Hezbollah was in the government. The understanding was between two sides, and a third side was missing, which was the authority. Two conditions should be achieved: the Shebaa Farms and the hostages. The third condition is determining the strategy with other sides so that the government follows it officially. The right of the resistance is a sacred right in Europe and all across the world. It is not a religious issue.

The Shebaa Farms are Lebanese lands according to international law. In 1989, I was the prime minister and objected to the occupation of the last farm. As for the hostages, we cannot leave or relinquish them when they were resisting. The weapons [of the resistance] are there to safeguard Lebanon. I was attacked in the media when I said that the incident that took place on the borders did not provoke a war [when Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, starting the July War]. My perception for the defensive strategy after the liberation of the Shebaa Farms and the return of the hostages will be a defensive one and not a liberation one. No one imposes limits to our self-defense. The weapons' role is to defend us, and if the weapons are not in the hands of the resistance, they should be with the army. We have the right to have weapons.

Nasrallah: The resistance is a reaction and a result. It is not the problem. Before 1989, this resistance was not a problem. But the Israelis came and occupied us. We would not have been here had it not been for the occupation. Therefore, Hezbollah has nothing to do with the emergence of the Islamic state in Iran between 1982 and 1985. There were numerous parties operating in the resistance. After 1985, we remained Amal and Hezbollah. In 1990, Hezbollah remained. We refused to be part of the authority and remained a resistance movement. At the core, Hezbollah is a resistance movement. At the time, political action was established, and in 1992, we entered parliament not to change the regime, but to allow the resistance to have a voice in this council.

We didn’t even talk about partnership in the authority. The point was to secure a voice for the resistance in parliament. The victory came in 2000, and we dedicated it to the entire Lebanese people. This accomplishment was achieved in 2000. Our arms are not militia arms because they only fought the Israelis. After 2000, Kofi Annan visited us, and we talked about the occupied land and the detainees. But no progress was achieved. Some people do not care about the border in the South. We left it to the government to try and bring back the detainees and restore the Shebaa Farms. We thus stopped our operations except for the reminder operations. If you ask the people residing along the border in the South, they will tell you that the situation between 1984 and 2000 was completely different than after 2000 and until 2006.

We created a balance of terror, and the people along the border started living comfortably after we provided them with protection. What is important is not the disarmament in itself as much as it is the removal of what entailed the presence of these arms, i.e. the occupation and the threat. The Israelis can make up any excuse to wage war on Lebanon, therefore there are no guarantees. We have a clear strategy and a clear model, and the answer has always been: We must surrender the arms. What is the alternative? We failed to liberate the land or secure the return of the detainees through diplomacy. The understanding with General Aoun is less than the understanding I reached with PM Rafik Hariri a few weeks before he was martyred.

He had told me he believed in the resistance not only to liberate the Shebaa Farms and restore the detainees, but also to achieve a just peace. I added, “Until a comprehensive settlement is achieved in accordance with Hezbollah’s standards.” He said, “If I am in the government when this is achieved, I will ask you what you want to do. If you do not want to surrender your arms, I would rather present my resignation than see the country become a second Algeria.” Nothing was signed between us because I trusted him.

This issue was raised with Saad Hariri, who agreed to it and made the same commitments as his father. It was also approved by Walid Jumblatt, whose position you know: He wants to liberate Jerusalem. With General Aoun, we talked about a national defense strategy, which should be approved by all certainly, with the exception of those who do not care. We then talked about a strong, just state that could protect them from any attack. We don’t want to keep these arms if there is a state willing to take this responsibility.

[Question about Hezbollah’s security apparatus]

Hezbollah doesn’t have a security apparatus in Lebanon. We have a security apparatus in the South for scouting, and a security apparatus to protect our cadres. We do not have an apparatus covering all of Lebanon. We have discovered many networks in the suburbs because we live in the suburbs and have a preemptive security body. They on the other side have security apparatuses and should be the ones uncovering the networks. As for the accusations I made against Israel, they are political accusations based on many points. For example, the network of Majzoub in Sidon which used to take suitcases of explosives; where did these suitcases filled with explosives go?

I always used to say to those who asked me to protect them from the Syrians, “Bring me evidence that Syria is responsible so I adopt a position toward the Syrians.” When I went to extend my condolences to Hariri’s family, and the whole family was present, the security tribunal was not established yet. The idea of a Saudi-Lebanese investigation committee was proposed, and I told them I would talk to the Syrian president. I talked to him, and he agreed without hesitation and without the interference of the Syria intelligence. I informed Hariri’s family of that. How can I accuse Syria without evidence? What is the secret behind this coup against the resistance and the history of the resistance?

They used this point to topple all the alliances and the commitments. I made a commitment that was not a secret one between me and Hariri, and I said it in the media: If it is proven that Syria killed Hariri, I stand alongside Hariri. However, it is neither acceptable nor fair to attack Syria before I have proof.

[Question to Aoun about the international tribunal not being mentioned in the Memorandum of Understanding]

Aoun: We were the first to demand an international investigation committee, and we recognized what the official authorities are recognizing. Regarding the international investigation and after three years, we have not reached anything. There are people who were arrested and whose cases should be looked into. There are other means besides arresting them, such as preventing them from travelling and placing them under house arrest. The paper [the Memorandum of Understanding] was a great thing. It consecrated the policy of understanding and openness, and not the policy of clashes. This can be felt in the Bekaa, the South and in East Sidon. The psychological friction lines were removed in Ain al-Remmaneh, and I sensed that personally. The natural interaction between the people was resumed.

The July War also consecrated this understanding and toppled numerous fears and reservations. In the dialogue I put it forward before everyone so that it was studied and discussed, even if it was attacked at the level of the state, and even though we were accused of being affiliated to certain axes. It is a Lebanese paper. It turned out that any understanding between the Lebanese was prohibited to allow the passing of certain projects such as the [New] Middle East, the nationalization of the Palestinians and the [cancellation of their] right of return. This understanding closed many doors. I don’t know where the terrorism accusations came from, as we were only trying to protect Lebanon. Personally, and after Hezbollah entered the government while I was in the opposition, I wondered: Am I accused of terrorism or is Hezbollah accused of terrorism? Am I not allowed to talk to Hezbollah?

Nasrallah: This document is the main draft that set the foundation for the dialogue table around which the majority of the document’s articles were discussed. We brought two prominent political movements to the dialogue table, both of which reached an agreement over these articles. Internal peace is one which enters the hearts and the homes. I use this expression which the General always says about internal peace. Ever since the Taif Agreement was signed, and until the exit of the Syrians, the Muslims were - for the majority - the allies of Syria. Those in the March 14 forces were among its closest allies, and the Christians were frustrated. After the Syrian exit, another type of division emerged in Lebanon.

However, the majority of Christians were also on the other side. This is why we say February 14, because on March 14, the Free Patriotic Movement was with them. Following this division, the understanding secured peace after the acute tensions and did not establish a Christian-Shia alliance. The General and I answered this question and said that this alliance was the nucleus of the national alliance we felt. The level of communication became different in all areas. It set the bases for communication and psychological and spiritual peace. Hence, when the Black Sunday events occurred, strife was thwarted because of this understanding. Not because of its three pages, but because of what it achieved in two years. The friction-line language was thus toppled and eliminated. This internal peace is the greatest accomplishment.

Aoun: There is something important that should be mentioned. Within 24 hours, the aftermath of February 5 was erased because of this understanding, despite the violence that occurred one day earlier. The Sunday events were a blood baptism for this understanding, one which we managed to overcome peacefully. The following Sunday witnessed a natural demonstration of national unity and was not a political occasion.

Nasrallah: The biggest achievement was accomplished during the July War. Israel recognized its defeat, the resistance won, and Lebanon, of course, won. The key element, beyond the resistance and the fighting of the men, was the popular support granted to these fighters. Their parents were displaced, and over one million displaced people were embraced by the Lebanese, especially in the Christian areas. They were embraced by the Free Patriotic Movement, Marada and the Church. Had it not been for this climate, the situation would’ve been different, and had it not been for this embrace, we could have lost the war or headed toward a civil one.

As for the Winograd Report, it didn’t aim to do us justice but to serve Israel and correct the mistakes. What was concealed in it was even more important, especially the part that actually did us justice and talked about the fact that the war decision had been issued in advance and that the war plans were ready for the end of September, beginning of October, considering that the tourism season would have ended, that they would be more prepared, and that the congressional elections would have been held. We thank God that it happened in July, because in October, there was a plan to annihilate us in three days in accordance with a surprise plan. This failure secured our victory. Olmert’s government neither achieved a political accomplishment nor a military one.

We thank Winograd for his honesty regarding the future, for this entity is built on power and arrogance. Waging wars should be done in specific international and regional circumstances and also with respect to military capacity. It should also take into consideration the decision of the Israeli government and the tolerance ability of the Israeli people. When I talked about possessing missiles that could reach Israel, I was not flaunting our abilities. I was trying to prevent the war from erupting by forcing Israel to take into consideration the fact that there is no safe place in occupied Palestine. Through our readiness, we tried to postpone the war because Israel needed to be ready to wage it.

Aoun: Even if there was no paper of understanding, I should be with my people during the war and blame Hezbollah after the war. But during the war, I am with my people. On February 14, PM Hariri was assassinated. We were the first to participate in the protests. Everything changed, and everyone became part of the authority, while I became part of the opposition. When President Assad attacked PM Siniora, we stood behind him, and when a subpoena was issued against Walid Jumblatt, we stood behind him. I work in accordance with my convictions, and this has nothing to do with any political agreements. The understanding did not intend to allow us to partake in ruling. War erupted as they were still ruling. We demanded a national-unity government.

In the Winograd Report, I tried to look for the parts that were erased, because we know the majority of what was announced, and we know the position of the government toward the war. If we want to make a comparison, by being allied to Hezbollah, I became an ally of Syria and Iran. Therefore, since the Lebanese government is allied with America, which is supporting Israel with airplanes, ammunition and smart bombs, and by using the same aforementioned standards, I would say the government was allied with Israel. Those who want to uphold independence are accusing half the Lebanese people of collaborating with foreign forces. Where does the solution start? With half of Lebanon? A concerned rule should start with national unity.

Regarding the return of Amr Moussa, an agreement should be reached over the president, over the second article and all the articles before starting the implementation. A partial implementation is impossible to carry out. As for the guarantees, they should emerge from all the Lebanese, and this is what I told the French president when he put forward the guarantees. I told him that international and regional policies changed, which is why we wanted guarantees among each other, we the Lebanese, who respected the Arab guarantees provided for the implementation of Taif. We should assume the responsibility. The consensus candidate is a candidate to uphold consensus.

We have adopted the candidacy of General Sleiman to uphold the consensus, and we support him within the context of the articles we put forward. They are the earned rights of the Lebanese people, because we cannot allow the exclusion of the strongest candidate for the presidency and see the election of another president. There are attempts to exclude us. Therefore, there was no agreement. The president cannot do anything. The rhetoric of the loyalists is not a consensus one but rather one of escalation. Saying we are restraining the president with our conditions is misleading.

I have no problem with General Sleiman, and the issue is not one between two people. It is between us and those who hold the majority. As for the guaranteeing third, I already gave up on those who I represent by withdrawing my candidacy. I cannot shock my popular base by relinquishing my participation and rendering my presence only in form.

Nasrallah: Regarding the Mar Mikhael events, I extend my condolences to the families of the martyrs. There are many readings and analyses. Since the first night, we demanded an investigation and the transfer of the dossier to the military judiciary without giving the information we had to the media outlets. We all presented the information we had to the security bodies involved in the investigations. We in Hezbollah have decided not to put forward any reading so that we do not place pressures on the investigations. We demand fairness and justice. When General Sleiman visited me, I insisted on the investigation, a thing which he did as well.

We are still following the investigations, which have been ongoing in a serious and satisfying way. We do not want people to be randomly held responsible. We want facts and for the responsibilities to be defined. What happened is not permissible, and I said that to General Sleiman. There were many similar incidents that were dealt with differently. Therefore, investigations should be conducted to see whether or not there were bad intentions. I cannot make any accusations, which is why we need the investigations. Assuming that this action was not spontaneous and that Hezbollah and Amal did send this group to take to the streets, this doesn’t change anything to the facts.

[Nasrallah then recalled the January 23, 2007 events and how the FPM and the opposition were shot at and beaten and how the security forces handled the situation; and of the January 25, 2007 events at the Arab University and how the army did not shoot back at those who shot at it.]

I consider all those who were martyred to be like Martyr Hadi [Nasrallah's son]. We should handle these events by containing the incident, through justice and serious investigations. I told General Sleiman that protecting the army is done through a serious and decisive investigation. For three years, the army has managed to uphold national unity because it defended everyone. When it starts serving one team, it will lose and so will Lebanon. The military institution should be preserved for Lebanon’s sake. As for the families of the martyrs, I assure them that the investigations will continue day and night until it reaches a result and accusations are made.

Aoun: We were subjected to media and political attacks aiming to undermine this understanding, and it is still present for all the Lebanese to join. This is the way toward peace.

Nasrallah: In the end, I would like to say that even if the understanding did not emerge, the July War would have been waged. We talked about a national-unity government after the understanding, and the idea became more persistent after the war in light of the government’s behavior. This understanding has brought tranquility, and we need trust. The strategic problem now resides in the lack of trust, and by cooperating with each other, we can restore it.

===================================================================
===================================================================
Liban : Aoun s’explique
11 décembre 2006
Claude Salhani :
Many people in Lebanon find your alliance with Hezbollah a bit strange. Can you clarify your political philosophy ?
Aoun : When I returned from France there was a real problem on the Lebanese (political) scene. I supported (U.N. Security Council Resolution) 1559 (calling for Hezbollah to relinquish its weapons). But I was confronted by a political class, which included (Druze leader) Walid Jumblatt, Saad Hariri (son and political heir of slain former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri) who said Hezbollah should hold on to their weapons. I found myself alone, against Hezbollah and everyone else, the Lebanese Forces, the Phalanges, Hariri, Jumblatt, Amal ; all were in an electoral political alliance.
I was isolated. I found that there was cheating going on. Jumblatt and Hariri were promising the French and Americans that they would disarm Hezbollah while they were promising Hezbollah they would protect them.
Given this ambiguous situation I felt we were heading for a confrontation and not a solution of the problem. Knowing the nature of Hezbollah, knowing the nature of the others and knowing the U.S. and French position on the issue I imagined how to resolve the problem since no one had the necessary force to resolve the problem by force.
We engaged in dialogue with Hezbollah and agreed to a memorandum of understanding. Once the paper was published there erupted a political explosion against Gen. Aoun.We managed to get Hezbollah to limit their demands to purely Lebanese issues.
They stopped talking about Jerusalem, a global Middle East solution ... we got them to focus on purely Lebanese issues, such as the Shebaa Farms, an area I know very well having served there as a young lieutenant.
Yes, the Farms belong to Lebanon.As soon as the (Lebanese) territory (occupied by Israel) is liberated, Hezbollah’s weapons should become defensive weapons and become integrated in a defensive strategy under Lebanese Army command. And from the moment the Shebaa Farms are returned to Lebanese sovereignty, Hezbollah’s weapons would no longer be used against Israel.
Q : What did you think when Hezbollah kidnapped the three Israeli soldiers in July, sparking Israel’s devastating retaliation ?
A : It was a military action to which we were used. This (type of operations) has been going on since 1982. Just two weeks earlier Lebanese security forces broke up a Mossad (Israeli intelligence) cell that was responsible for the killings of five people in Lebanon.
Q : Do you think Hezbollah should have kidnapped those three soldiers ?
A : (Hezbollah Secretary-General) Hassan Nasrallah always said you have to take (Israeli) prisoners in order to obtain the release of Hezbollah prisoners. It was part of the game. The surprise was Israel’s reaction. And the second surprise was Hezbollah’s readiness.
Q : But when Hamas kidnapped one Israeli soldier near Gaza just a week earlier, the response from Israel was overwhelming.
A : We didn’t receive the message.
Q : So how do you go about convincing Hezbollah to hand in its weapons ?
A : That can only happen through "trust building."
Q : How would you apply that in Lebanon ?
A : We have to break the circle of fear in which we live in today. If there is no exchange of trust, we remain wary of one another and it offers a permanent source of conflict. One of the first questions I asked Hezbollah was "Tell me your fears ? Tell me about your fears ?
Q : What was their reply ?
A : They said that they lived first for about 15 years under Palestinian control and suffered a lot. Then came the Israeli occupation. The Lebanese army and government were unable to offer security. We (Hezbollah) succeeded through our resistance to liberate a part of our territory. All solutions should take into account all those fears.
Q : What is your opinion on the Taif peace accords (which put an end to the Lebanese civil war) ?
A : Taif was not a choice, it was a dictat. However, we managed to shape a constitution. We have to respect these accords, though they have to become firmer. But much of what was agreed in Taif was never implemented, such as the voting law, decentralization.
Q : Suppose that tomorrow you are president of the Lebanese Republic. How would you go about removing Hezbollah’s weapons ?
A : I would put the state in charge of the defense of the country and ensure calm along the border. And integrate the weapons into the army’s defensive system.
Q : Some people say your attitude towards Syria has changed. They accuse you of shifting policy from anti-Syrian to pro-Syrian. How do you reply to that ?
A : My attitude has not changed. I always said if the Syrians leave Lebanon we would try to have very good relations with Syria. And I have no links with Syria. There will be no return to (Syrian) tutelage. There should be full diplomatic relations and exchanges of ambassadors.
Q : Do you believe the Syrians have withdrawn from Lebanon ?
A : (Laughter) They withdrew militarily, but they still try to impose their influence. The Syrians left, but left behind two explosive situations : Hezbollah and the Palestinian
Q : How do you feel when accused of being pro-Syrian ?
A : First I was raging mad. Later it had no effect on me.
Q : It’s been said that you have a short temper.
A : I lose my temper over small things, such as over breaking a cup of coffee, but I stay calm under fire.
Q : You threatened of taking to the street and organizing demonstrations if the government does not resign. Would you still do that ?
A : That is a means, not the only means to resist this government.
Q : If you could ask President Bush one question, what would it be ?
A : I don’t think that he would listen to me. We have to use a correct process to install democracy and then to safeguard the values of democracy in the fight against corruption. If we can get rid of corruption in Lebanon it would be a miracle ... And I would merit going to heaven.
===================================================================
The general and the Ayatollah
Feb, 2006

Following a historic accord struck between Hizbullah and Lebanon's Christians, Michel Aoun speaks to Omayma Abdel-Latif about the new moment in Lebanese politics
The scene was unprecedented in the history of post-war Lebanon. Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hizbullah, traditionally Syria's long-time ally, shaking hands with Michel Aoun, Syria's arch enemy for almost 15 years and who championed a war from his position in exile in France against the Syrian presence in Lebanon.

Mar Mekhayel Church in Haret Hureek, originally the birthplace of Aoun and the Shia heartland in Beirut played host to the signing of what came to be known as "a declaration of understanding", a document comprised of 10 points which tackled the most ticklish issues in today's Lebanese politics, from Hizbullah's arms to the relationship with Syria, passing through the efforts to bring back the Lebanese state and put an end to political corruption.

Many analysts described the event as "a political coup", from a historical point of view. An "earthquake", suggested others, which shattered the political traditions in Lebanese politics of organising along sectarian lines.

It also came at a time when sectarian tension is at an all time high. It was the latest in a string of events unleashed by Aoun's homecoming from exile last May. The general's return has been received with mixed reactions from varied political forces.

Despite attempts by opposition forces then to isolate Aoun and marginalise his contribution in the political process, Aoun remained a key player in the reshaping of the political landscape following the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. His landslide victory in the parliamentary elections -- he leads a bloc of 21 seats -- anointed him and his movement the Free Patriotic Movement ( Tayyar ) as representing the Christian street par excellence.

Although Aoun boasts that 20 per cent of his constituency are Muslims, yet many believe that the significance of his return lies in the fact that he has been crowned as the leader of Lebanon's Christians.

A year after Rafik Al-Hariri's assassination, and as Lebanon stands at a historic juncture, Aoun is one of the few Lebanese politicians who read events well, as proven by his deal with Nasrallah; that both have a constituency that cannot be ignored by the 14 March team which rule Lebanon today. At his office in Al-Rabiya, Aoun spoke to Al-Ahram Weekly about the current political situation and implications of the deal with Hizbullah on the future of the political process in Lebanon.

How do you assess the situation a year after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri?

No doubt Al-Hariri's assassination has been a catalyst accelerating efforts towards the implementation of Resolution 1559 in respect to the Syrian withdrawal. It also led to my homecoming after years in exile and the release of Samir Geagea, head of the Lebanese militia. Holding the parliamentary elections was yet another important development but it exposed the acute political crisis the country was facing when the political elite failed to establish a new elections law. This meant that the election results did not reflect correctly the present political scene. This distortion was also present in the composition of the new government and parliament. In the meantime, we have witnessed a surge in the role played by the media in inciting hatred and sectarian tension in a way that goes against a basic code of ethics.

Do you think the high levels of sectarian tension can lead to civil war in Lebanon?

There are wise men in Lebanon today who remain in control of the situation. I don't think there is a will to initiate sectarian strife. I believe that those who control the situation on the ground don't want to have war, and those who have the will to start a war don't have the power to do so. They keep the levels of tension high through fiery discourses but they cannot change the situation on the ground because those able to start a war don't want it.

Do you mean Hizbullah and your Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)?
I cannot comment on this.

You said that the current composition of parliament does not reflect the true weight of political forces on the ground; so you agree with Nasrallah's description of the majority which is in power as a "false majority"?

We can explain this through the number of votes each of the three political forces that comprise the bulk of the assembly gained during elections. There are now three axes within the assembly: Al-Mustaqbal and its allies which has 72 seats -- it has gained the third of the votes; the second is the Hizbullah-Amal axis, and it also gained a third of the votes with 34 seats; and the third is the FPM and its allies, and it also got the last third of the votes with 21 seats. In terms of numbers, Hizbullah and FPM both represent one third of the assembly, but in reality they became the majority thanks to the number of seats.

Seven months after the opposition came to power how do you read their performance, particularly regarding the security situation?

Their political discourse shows that they run the affairs of the country in an amateurish way. They were made politicians under the gaze of the Syrians. Today they have proved a disastrous failure in handling security in Lebanon, particularly in such a volatile situation as that following the Syrian withdrawal. They lack the technical abilities and the leadership to run a proper security establishment.

Do you believe that the situation will escalate under this government?

Yes, things are only getting worse.

In your view, why is there fear among some Lebanese politicians of Arab mediation between Syria and Lebanon?

Those who fear mediation efforts think that there is something that they will lose if Arab mediation takes place. But the irony is that the majority that is in power is the one that is rejecting any efforts for mediation sponsored by Arab parties. This is why, when the situation in Lebanon came to a standstill, I took the initiative and called for national dialogue among different political groups and put all the issues on the table. When no one responded to our call, we opted for a bilateral dialogue with Hizbullah, and we reached an understanding on nearly all the controversial issues.

What needs to be done for this declaration to see light on the ground?

Both Hizbullah and the FPM cannot achieve all the points mentioned on their own. There is an important role for the state. We only put forward a draft paper in which we offered our views regarding key controversial issues, and the ways in which they can be approached and resolved. Government partnership is vital. We only established the framework. What is important is the significance of the deal where two major powers in the country have opted for dialogue and reached an agreement over the most sensitive of issues.

Do you expect other political forces, like the Future bloc ( Tayyar Al-Mustaqbal), will join forces with FPM and Hizbullah?

The problem with the Future bloc is that there are two types of discourses; the political discourse that is flexible and the media discourse that incites hatred and is the more powerful on the ground.

You say that the government is essential. Do you think that the issue of Hizbullah's decommissioning is one such issue where you will need the partnership of the ruling powers?

We have offered our understanding of how the issue of Hizbullah arms should be tackled. We have put conditions on the context in which Hizbullah arms should be used in defence of the Lebanese land and until the Shebaa Farms are liberated.
But signals coming lately from the government are perplexing. Some, like Jumblatt, call for disarmament and accuse Hizbullah of being a Syrian or an Iranian agent, while others have a different line?

Let them dare ask Hizbullah to decommission. I don't think this is a proper way to deal with Hizbullah. We are one people; they are citizens of this land as much as we are. They have made sacrifices to liberate the south and their resistance was legitimate and holistic. These are the same people we are dealing with today and who said they want to keep their arms forever. Our mission is not to destroy Hizbullah but to allow it to enter the political process to achieve the goals for which it took up arms. I believe that Hizbullah's leadership has flexibility and there is a will to transform.

Walid Jumblatt insists that Shebaa Farms are not Lebanese territory and that they are being used as a pretext by Hizbullah to keep its arms. What will be the fate of the joint FPM-Hizbullah declaration in light of such comments?

Jumblatt's map is of no use. There are maps that show the farms in Lebanon and there are others that show them belonging to Syria. There are ownership documents which were issued from the Lebanese authorities and land ownership is the only arbiter to decide where sovereignty lies.

A recent statement by the 14 March team -- an allusion to the Hariri-Jumblatt-Geagea axis -- clearly stated that the national consensus over Hizbullah's arms has eroded. What is your comment?

Yes, the national consensus might be like before, but resistance arms are tied with the liberation of Shebaa Farms, the release of all Lebanese prisoners and the issue of Palestinian arms outside the camps. These issues are all related. We cannot ask a Lebanese group to put down its arms while Palestinian groups remain armed. In other words, it is only natural that you set some priorities before getting down to Hizbullah's arms.

Who deals with the larger issue of defending Lebanon's national security against ongoing Israeli violations?

This should be the strategy of the state; and when there is first a clear strategy as to how the state will protect national interests against such violations we would reach the final stage where Hizbullah decommissions or integrates within the national defence mechanism of the state.
To what extent was there a consensus inside the FPM over the deal with Hizbullah? Some say that prospects of such a deal angered a number of your constituency?

It took us six months of intense discussions to reach that level of understanding with Hizbullah. Every word is carefully chosen. In the end, when the FPM and Hizbullah reach an agreement it is not about who made concessions more than whom. It is Lebanon that truly wins. We might indeed have lost some of our undecided or neutral sympathisers, but we have definitely gained more -- particularly amongst Lebanese Muslims. We know that FPM popularity skyrocketed in Akar, for example, where there is a dominant Sunni constituency. We wanted to be forces of stability in the country.

US officials expressed concern over your deal with Hizbullah. The US ambassador visited you. Did you discuss the issue with him?

We explained a few points. We also explained that this deal is not against any party but rather an effort to start a dialogue amongst ourselves.

Do you consider it to be a new Taif agreement?

I cannot say it is a new Taif because there is no contradiction between our agreement and Taif. On the contrary, it sought to resolve some of the issues that were left unresolved in Taif.