http://www.tayyar.org/Tayyar/FPMParty/GMA/Biography.htm
The youngest Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese Army (1984-1990) and ex-Prime Minister of Lebanon (1988-1990), the “General”, as the Lebanese call him, is today a deputy of the Kesrouan-Jbeil district, the Head of the Change and Reform parliamentary bloc (consisting of 22 deputies from all the Lebanese communities) at the Lebanese Parliament and the leader of the Lebanese opposition.
Michel Aoun was born on February 18th, 1935 in Haret Hreik, a Christian-Shiite village located in the southern suburbs of Beirut. He is the son of Naim Aoun, a farmer, and Marie née Aoun, a housewife. His family consisted of six children: three boys and three girls. He studied in Beirut where he attended the educational institution of the Brothers of the Christian Schools and the Sacred Heart School. As a teenager, he found himself forced to suspend his studies for an entire academic year due to the financial situation of his family. During that year, he worked as a trainee in industrial drawings at an engineering studies office. When he returned to school, he successfully completed the educational curriculum, which is normally covered in two years, in one single year.
Although he was born in a Christian family with strong spiritual values, as a young boy, Michel Aoun succeeded to establish friendships with several Muslim comrades. “We have never had prejudices or discrimination between Ali and Pierre or Hassan and Michel”, he says. “We shared our meals and we slept over at each other’s houses. Their religious celebrations were ours and ours were theirs.”
Two major incidents deeply influenced his childhood and made him the man he is today; the spirit of rebellion was born in him and he applied it to defend the rights of his homeland and its people. The first incident consisted in the harassment of the women in his village by the Senegalese soldiers serving with the French army during the mandate in the 40’s; the other incident occurred during World War II when the Australian soldiers of the Allied Forces invaded the houses of Haret Hreik at night and took the villagers by surprise, including his family and him.
It was in this spirit that in 1948, at the age of 13, he volunteered to distribute humanitarian aids to the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.
On November 30th, 1968, he married Nadia El-Chami. They had three girls together: Mireille, Claudine and Chantal, and today, they have eight grandchildren. Michel Aoun has always shown great attachment to family values, and the support of his family, who has never left his side, was certainly crucial in getting him through the difficult times in his life.
His Military Career
On 1/10/1955, Michel Aoun joined the military school as an officer cadet. He was given his first rank as second lieutenant in the artillery on 30/9/1958. Then, he was appointed captain in 1968, major in 1974, lieutenant colonel in 1975 and colonel in 1980.
During the period extending from 1959 till 1972, Aoun occupied several positions in the army artillery in several Lebanese regions. In August 1973, he was transferred to Saida, North Lebanon, where he was placed in command of the 2nd artillery battalion. During the clashes between the Lebanese Army and the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) at the beginning of 1976, Michel Aoun kept ground in spite of the military command’s passivity in giving out orders and continued to defend the remaining free enclaves, while several soldiers, who were concerned for the fate of their families, returned to their villages.
From January 1976 till 1978, he occupied positions in Yarzeh with a mission to reorganize the artillery. From 1978 till 1980, he attended a session of studies at the Higher War School in Paris (France).
When he came back to Lebanon on 20/09/1980, he was dispatched to the Army Staff – Department of Personnel – in the capacity of Acting Head of the Technical Bureau.
On 24/12/1980, he was appointed Major of the Ain El-Remmaneh-Baabda department. Thus, Michel Aoun was in command of the “Defense Brigade”, which units had been stationed along the lines of demarcation separating the East and West sectors of the capital. During the Israeli invasion of Beirut, his troops stopped the advance of the Tsahal towards the southern suburbs of Beirut.
On 14/08/1982, he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Armed Forces charged with upholding security in Beirut and entrusted with law enforcement during the evacuation of the Israeli army.
By the end of 1982, he was called up to form and be in command of a multifunctional brigade: the 8th brigade known for its heroism during the most crucial battles of the Lebanese War. In 1983, Michel Aoun, at the head of this brigade, won the battle of Souk el-Gharb after fighting off the assault of the Syrian army and its local allies (the Druze militias of Walid Jumblat’s Progressive Socialist Party and certain Palestinian divisions) on the Lebanese regions still under the control of the legal government.
In recognition of his heroism in defending the capital, Aoun was appointed Brigadier-General on 01/01/1984, and on 23/06/1984, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
Sessions Attended Abroad
Michel Aoun was awarded diplomas from:
- The Artillery Training School in Chalons-sur-Marne in France (1959)
- The USA Army Artillery and Missile School in the United States (1966)
- The Higher War School in Paris (1980)
In 1983, he participated in military maneuvers in Fort Benning in the United States.
Medals, Distinctions and Commendations
General Aoun was awarded many medals:
At the national level:
Memorial Medal of 31/12/1961
Lebanese Silver Order of Merit
War medals (4 times)
National Cedar Medal, rank of Knight
Lebanese Order of Merit, 2nd rank
Purple Heart Medal
Lebanese Order of Merit, 1st rank
National Cedar Medal, rank of Officer
National Cedar Medal, rank of Grand Officer
Distinction of the General Commander-in-Chief of the Army (6 times)
Commendations of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army (3 times)
At the international level:
Commander of the Legion of Honor by the President of the French Republic (January 29th, 1986)
His Political Career
During the summer of 1988, the presence of the Syrian occupation army and the existing political pressures made it impossible to elect a president for the Republic. Before leaving Lebanon, President Amine Gemayel, by virtue of Decrees No. 5387 and 5388, appointed Michel Aoun at the head of a government consisting of the Army Staff, which principal task was to ensure the election of a new president. This government, which puts an end to the functions of the previous Council of Ministers pursuant to the Constitution, was not acknowledged by the Syrians who gave recognition to the government of Selim Hoss .
On March 6th, 1989, Aoun’s government decided to reactivate the Maritime Chamber in view of regulating illegal ports, which were set up without government authorization during the 14 years of war and which became sources of income for the Syrian militias and army who used the ports to smuggle drugs and weapons. As a result, the Syrian artillery immediately bombed the Port of Beirut. On March 14th, 1989, the bombing hit the office of Michel Aoun at the Ministry of National Defense and attained civilians, resulting in 38 dead and 142 injured. On that same day, Michel Aoun declared the “Liberation War” and officially ordered the Syrians to withdraw their troops from Lebanon. “We have decided to fight and we are certain that victory will be ours”, he confirmed in April 1989. “If we lose, we will at least have left our children with the right to protect their homeland. In all events, we will never give it away to the Syrians.”
In October 1989, the Lebanese deputies were convened in Taif in Saudi Arabia to discuss a “national accord document”. Aoun requested that they not commit to the document before a firm decision is taken concerning the evacuation of the Syrian troops from the Lebanese territories and that they not allow any change to the Constitution before the withdrawal.
On October 22nd, 1989, 58 deputies ratified the “Taif Agreement” by show of hands. Michel Aoun objected to the agreement, seeing that it would not contribute in recovering the peace and would only reconfirm the Syrian control over Lebanon. He warned the deputies of the possible dissolution of the Parliament. However, the deputies met under the Syrian supervision to elect a president: René Moawad (assassinated on 22/11/1989), and then, Elias Hraoui. Aoun appealed against the dissolution of the Parliament by virtue of motivated decree No. 420 of November 4th, 1989. Tremendous demonstrations that have never been witnessed before rushed forth to support the General at the Presidential Palace, renamed the “House of the People”, and permanent sit-ins were held in the gardens surrounding the Palace.
However, when it became evident that the western forces supported “Taif”, that a first attempt was made to dislodge him from Baabda on January 30th, 1990 through the fierce confrontations between the Army and the Lebanese Forces of Samir Geagea and the embargo imposed on the regions under his control, all taking place in vain, and that the invasion of the free regions became inevitable, Michel Aoun officially accepted to ratify the agreement under the following conditions:
1- Lifting the embargo;
2- Acknowledging Elias Hraoui;
3- The consecutive resignation of the 2 governments of Aoun and Hoss;
4- Constituting a credible and representative government of national union;
5- Dissolving the militias;
6- Unifying the army;
7- Refraining from appointing new deputies;
8- Holding free legislative elections under international supervision (ex. under the supervision of the UNO);
9- Ratifying constitutional changes.
These conditions aiming at preserving democracy and national sovereignty were refused.
After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the American government desperately called for Syria’s participation in the coalition it raised against Baghdad. In return for its participation, the Bush government will give Syria the green light to carry out its conquest of Lebanon.
At the dawn of October 13th, 1990, the Syrian army, supported by its intensive bombing raids, invaded the free territories of Lebanon. In the early morning and in view of avoiding a bloodbath, Michel Aoun ordered ceasefire negotiated by the French Ambassador in Lebanon, René Ala. He was asked to head to the embassy headquarters to confirm the negotiated agreement. He was forbidden to leave and go back to the Presidential Palace of Baabda. He arrived to France on August 30th, 1991. Thus, his 15-year exile in France began.
On February 18th, 1996, the resistance movement against the occupation was established, the “Free Patriotic Movement” (FPM).
In September 2003, Michel Aoun testified before the American Congress in favor of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act. In his testimony, he confirmed that “the genuine nature of the Lebanese people is reflected in their love for freedom and their affection towards America; and the genuine nature of America is reflected in its support of those who seek freedom… We have never lost faith – and we never will – that our natural allies in the free world will finally see [the Lebanese struggle with Syria] for what it truly is: a fight for freedom against terrorism and oppression”.
On 21/11/2004, on the eve of Independence Day, Michel Aoun called for a Lebanese national dialogue to reach the necessary solutions in view of turning a new page in the history of Lebanon, which will take place upon the imminent retreat of the Syrian army.
On February 14th, 2005, ex-Prime Minister Rafic Hariri was assassinated in Beirut. The crime led to a revolutionary uproar and a movement of indignation causing the emergence of several demonstrations that called for the immediate withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon. The Syrian army left the Land of the Cedars for the last time on April 27th, 2005 after about three decades of occupation.
On May 7th, 2005, Michel Aoun returned to Beirut after 15 years in exile. He was acclaimed by hundreds of thousands of Lebanese who jammed the streets of the capital to welcome him back.
In June 2005, the FPM focused all its efforts on the legislative elections. Michel Aoun and his proponents came forth with a program including the following keywords: laicism, change, reform, transparency, auditing public funds, responsibility, true democracy, putting an end to corruption, extending the authority of the Lebanese State all over the territory… In spite of the lack of time and funding required to conduct an electoral campaign, the controlled media propaganda launched by his opponents, an electoral law (imposed by the Syrians in 2000) carved to ensure the victory of some at the expense of others… Michel Aoun and his allies won 21 of 128 seats in the Parliament.
On February 6th, 2006, a document of bilateral accord was signed between Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary General of “Hezbollah”, and Michel Aoun. This document consisted of 10 issues of purely Lebanese concern, providing a pacifist framework for the implementation of Resolution 1559 issued by the Security Council, particularly with regard to the weapons of “Hezbollah”. This document received mixed reviews, and the attempt to promote national unity was misinterpreted by the press that unleashed against him a most virulent campaign conducted to mislead the public opinion by making it seem that Michel Aoun has converted – sic – into a pro-Syrian and pro-Iranian.
This campaign grew into an even bigger, more deceitful campaign in the effect of his position vis-à-vis the International Tribunal that the UN is set on initiating to try the assassins of ex-Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. Truth be said, Michel Aoun was the first to claim the constitution of a mixed tribunal to determine the perpetrators of this crime, not failing since then to restate his original position at every possible occasion, all without receiving any favorable echoes.
In an attempt to overcome all conflicts, the frontline representatives of all the Lebanese parties initiated a national dialogue during the second half of 2006, which rounds were soon interrupted by Israel’s merciless attack on Lebanon in July-August 2006. Lebanon succeeded to come on top but the prices paid at all levels turned out to be extremely high.
It is at that time that Michel Aoun called for the constitution of a government of national unity that is capable of managing the consequences of the dilemma being lived. However, the existing government insisted on focusing on the International Tribunal and nothing else, without taking into consideration the remarks put forth by the Shiite ministers on this project, which led to their resignation in November 2006, after which they joined the Opposition where they stood behind the FPM. Thus, the Council of Ministers was deemed unconstitutional pursuant to Article 95-J of the Preamble of the Lebanese Constitution.
Putting forth two recommendations: the constitution of a government of national unity and holding the anticipated legislative elections, the different constituents of the opposition organized two monster demonstrations in downtown Beirut each consisting of about 1.5 million Lebanese . The demonstrators then organized a huge permanent sit-in in downtown Beirut, which Lebanon has never witnessed before. Fouad Siniora, at the head of the government, insisted on turning a deaf ear and not stepping down.
On 30/03/2007, Michel Aoun met with Ban Ki-Moon, the UN Secretary General. He informed him by written notice of the potential dangers putting Lebanon at threat, the biggest danger being the proliferation of terrorist cells in the country with the authorities’ knowledge. Two months later, one terrorist cell, known as Fateh Al-Islam and connected to Al-Qaida, shut down 10 officers and soldiers of the Lebanese Army while they were near the Palestinian refugee camp in Nahr al-Bared located in North Lebanon. This led the Lebanese army to strike back by waging an anti-terrorist war against the terrorists, among whom were many Saudis. The General gave the army his absolute, unconditional and unfailing support, calling upon the international community to provide the army not only with verbal support but also with the necessary material assets to go through with their counterattack.
Strengthened by a massive popular support, Michel Aoun is a candidate for the presidency of the Lebanese Republic, for the establishment of a State of Law and a Modern State: a State that is worthy to contain the aspirations of all the Lebanese people.
His Works
Under the editorials of an-Nachra (issued weekly from 1992 till 2004), the General gave speeches and held conferences all around the world to defend the Lebanese cause: texts that were learned by several academics, transmitted among themselves via Internet or reproduced in brochures to be distributed to the proponents in secret.
Here-below are only some of his most famous works:
- His speech at the Lebanese National Congress in Paris (June 11th, 1994);
- His message at the Special Assembly for Lebanon of the Synod of Bishops of the Catholic Church, convened by Pope John Paul II at the Vatican ( December 5th, 1995);
- His speech at the European Parliament in Strasbourg (May 20th, 1996);
- Conference in Australia: “Lebanon: Past, Present and Future” (March 12th, 1998);
- His speech at the Imperial College in London: “The Dialogue: Road to Salvation” (October 12th, 2000);
- His speech in Lyon: “10 Years of Peace without Peace” (February 3rd, 2001);
- His speech in Versailles (January 24th, 2002), Address at the Higher School of Economic and Commercial Sciences: “Stability in Lebanon and Peace in the Middle East” (March 7th, 2002);
- His address at the “Foundation for the Defense of Democracies” in Washington DC (March 7th, 2003);
- Conference at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris (June 5th, 2003);
- His testimony at the American Congress for the ratification of the law “The Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act” (September 18th, 2003);
- His call for the Lebanese National Dialogue (November 21st, 2004);
- His address at the Maison de la Recherche at the Sorbonne for “The Geopolitical Days in Lebanon at the Sorbonne” (April 7th, 2005);
- Conference at the National Press Club in Washington: “The New Lebanon: from Liberation to Reform” (November 22nd, 2005).
In 2007, the General published his first book: “Une Certaine Vision du Liban” (interviews with Frederic Domont, Fayard editions), in which he refers to the fate of the Land of the Cedars, the country that gives out a message of pluralism, freedom and dialogue, the country juggling between cultures and religions, at the heart of the Middle East overtaken by homogenization and wars from the time of Abraham, and a world that is crushed day and day out by the aftermath of ideologies, the“Clash of Civilizations”.
================================================================
Michel Aoun: Former Lebanese PM
(Gary C Gambill; 2001)
http://www.meib.org/articles/0101_ld1.htm
Michel Aoun
Former Lebanese Prime Minister
by Gary C. Gambill
 |
| Michel Aoun |
For most ordinary Lebanese, however, Aoun remains the most salient symbol of secular Lebanese nationalism, a revolutionary commanding almost messianic adoration in the streets of Beirut. Many have questioned Aoun's judgement in launching his 1989 "war of liberation" against Syrian military forces, but few have questioned his integrity. Even his critics acknowledge that Aoun's refusal to compromise his principles in the face of overwhelming adversity struck a very powerful chord in the hearts of millions of Lebanese. "He was a David to an infinite Goliath," recalls former Foreign Minister Elie A. Salem, "and this image was well received by all the non-sophisticated in Lebanon, irrespective of religion and locale."1
Background
Aoun, a Maronite Christian, was born in 1935 to a poor family in Haret Hraik, a mixed Muslim-Christian suburb south of Beirut. He is remembered by many as an intelligent, hardworking child who transcended the difficult conditions of his youth. At age six, British and Australian allied forces evicted his family and occupied their house. As a child, he was forced to withdraw from school for an entire year for economic reasons and take a free apprenticeship in industrial drawing (he completed two years of coursework when he went back to school the following year so as not to fall behind).
Although his family was deeply religious and he attended Catholic schools, Aoun established close friendships with many Muslims during his early years. "We never distinguished between Ali and Peter, or between Hasan and Michel," he later recalled. "We ate together and slept at each other's homes. Their holidays were ours and our holidays were theirs."2
Aoun finished his secondary education in 1955 and enrolled in the Military Academy as a cadet officer. Three years later, he graduated as an artillery officer in the Lebanese Army. He later received additional training at Chalons-sur-Marnes, France (1958-59), Fort Seale, Oklahoma in the U.S. (1966) and the Ecole Superieure de Guerre, France (1978-80).
During the course of his military career, Aoun earned a reputation for honesty, integrity, and sectarian impartiality that was unrivaled at that time. In 1961, when two Army officers affiliated with the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) were arrested for attempting to launch a coup, Aoun personally intervened to stop Army Intelligence from torturing the two men, a practice he felt to be inhumane and immoral. Later, after returning from an assignment and finding that the two men had been tortured while he was away, Aoun condemned the intelligence apparatus for practicing "unacceptable Nazism."
As Lebanon slipped into civil war in the mid-1970's and the army fractured along sectarian lines, Aoun devotion to the central government remained unshaken. In the early 1980's Aoun was head of the "Defense Brigade" of the Lebanese army, a unit stationed along the "Green Line" separating East and West Beirut which engaged in sporadic fighting with Syrian military forces. During the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Aoun commanded his troops to block Israeli forces advancing on the presidential palace and was prepared to open fire until President Elias Sarkis personally ordered him to stand down. No other Christian officer attempted to confront the invading army. In late 1982, Aoun was assigned the task of forming and commanding a new multiconfessional unit, the 8th Brigade.
In 1983, Aoun's 8th Brigade defeated Syrian-backed militia forces attempting to overrun the strategic Souk al-Gharb pass overlooking the capital, a battle which one scholar called "the closest thing to real combat the Lebanese Army had ever experienced."3 In recognition of his heroic defense of the capital, Aoun was appointed Brigadier-General.
In June 1984, following the Luzanne reconciliation conference in Switzerland, Lebanon's new "national unity" government fired the commander of the Lebanese Army, Gen. Ibrahim Tannous, who was considered to have sectarian biases. Aoun was handpicked with strong consensus to replace him.
Aoun concentrated his efforts on preserving the strength and unity of the army, which remained in its barracks for the next four years amid the chaos of Lebanon's civil war, laying in wait for the day when it would be called upon to enforce a peace settlement. He intentionally stayed out of the public spotlight--aside from the armed forces' magazine, Aoun gave no interviews to the media between 1984 and 1988.
The Revolt Against Syria
In the fall of1988, Syria and the Christian Lebanese Forces (LF) militia brought about a political crisis by preventing parliament members in areas under their control to convene and elect a new president. Damascus, which staunchly opposed the election of any candidate unwilling to sign a treaty recognizing Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, wagered that the demise of the Lebanese Republic would create a political vacuum in which it could dominate the entire country. However, fifteen minutes before the expiration of his term, outgoing president Amin Gemayel appointed a military caretaker government, headed by Aoun as interim prime minister, to run the country until parliament could elect a new president. Although his government was clearly constitutional, 4 the Syrians backed the formation of a rival regime, supported by their client militias, in West Beirut. While Aoun's government was officially and implicitly recognized by several countries, most countries declined to formally recognize either regime.
At the time of Aoun's appointment, the Lebanese government controlled only a small area of the country, comprising parts of East Beirut and the surrounding suburbs. Arguing that the democratic process could not function while the vast majority of the country remained occupied by rival militias and the military forces of Syria and Israel, Aoun resolved to restore the authority of the state. In February 1989, Aoun traveled to a meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Tunisia and received strong support for the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. After his return, Aoun responded to provocations from the LF militia by ordering the 15,000 Lebanese army troops under his command into action. After a series of engagements, Lebanese army units seized the port of Beirut and other economically vital facilities. This was the first time that government authority had been restored to a militia-controlled area since the beginning of the civil war in 1975. That Aoun chose to target the main militia of his own Maronite community evoked expressions of surprise and satisfaction from Lebanese Muslims, whose victimization at the hands of the LF had never before elicited state intervention.
Next, Aoun enforced a maritime blockade of illegal ports run by Syrian-allied Druze and Shi'ite militias in West Beirut. When the Syrians responded by shelling civilian areas of East Beirut, Aoun declared war on Syria's occupation forces on March 14, 1989. "The question is no longer one of ports," he proclaimed, " . . . we have passed this and defined the ceiling--Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon." The Syrian and Lebanese armies clashed intermittently over the next six months amid fruitless mediation efforts by the Arab League, destroying much of Beirut and instigating an exodus of over one million inhabitants from the city.
Despite the enormous destruction visited upon the inhabitants of the 300-square mile enclave controlled by his forces, popular support for Aoun's war against the Syrian military skyrocketed. The Washington Post eloquently captured the revolutionary spirit prevailing in East Beirut and across the country:
The horror of those who survived has given way to a sense of defiance and exultation that is not easy to comprehend except for those touched by Aoun's cry for freedom . . . While giving the appearance of being only a professional soldier and officer, Aoun nevertheless has reached across religious boundaries and into the hearts of many Lebanese. If the groundswell of his public support endures through more war and destruction, many observers say, Aoun could go down as a revolutionary hero in Lebanon's history.5
 |
| Aoun, at a press conference in the presidential palace |
By the end of the summer, however, it was clear that intervention by the international community was not forthcoming, so Aoun agreed to an Arab League-brokered cease-fire in September 1989. After the cease-fire, a Saudi and American-sponsored meeting of Lebanese parliamentarians was organized in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, ostensibly to approve an agreement that would provide for the unification of Lebanon and the withdrawal of Syrian forces from the country. The final agreement did not, however, call for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon (Syrian officials objected to such wording, claiming that it would give Aoun a moral victory); rather, it stipulated only a limited redeployment to the Beqaa Valley within two years, after which "the Syrian government and the Lebanese national accord government shall decide on the redeployment of the Syrian forces" in the future. After heavy doses of intimidation by Syrian intelligence,7 followed by the verbal promises of American officials to rein in Damascus after Aoun's departure, the Lebanese delegates signed the so-called "Ta'if Accord."
Aoun rejected the agreement for a number of reasons, mainly because it failed to provide for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. The agreement also stipulated constitutional changes which, according to Aoun, required the democratic consent of the Lebanese people--not merely the rubber stamp approval of delegates from the traditional political class which bore responsibility for the war (parliamentary elections had not been held since 1972). The Syrians and their allies in West Beirut steadfastly refused to either subject the agreement to a popular referendum or permit modification at a later date by a legitimately-elected parliament. In accordance with the Ta'if Accord, the remaining members of the Lebanese parliament met at a Syrian-controlled air force base in November 1989 and elected Rene Mouawad as President of Lebanon. After his assassination just weeks after assuming office, Elias Hrawi was elected to succeed him.
 |
| A 1989 rally in support of Aoun |
Despite his continuing popular support within Lebanon, however, outside developments doomed Aoun's "revolution" to failure. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the American government desperately sought Syria's participation in the U.S.-led coalition against Baghdad. In return for Syrian support, the Bush administration gave Syria a green light to complete its conquest of Lebanon.8 On the morning of October 13, 1990, Syrian air and ground forces launched an all-out invasion of East Beirut and the surrounding areas controlled by Aoun's government. Realizing that further resistance would only lead to needless loss of life, Aoun went to the French embassy to negotiate a cease-fire under French auspices. As the scale of massacres and mayhem escalated and the presidential palace fell into the hands of the Syrians, Aoun accepted the French ambassador's offer of political asylum. Declaring that Aoun's safety was a "matter of honor," French President Francois Mitterand negotiated the beleaguered general's departure for exile in France ten months later.
After the Fall
Since his departure for exile in France, Aoun's predictions about what would become of Lebanon under Syrian tutelage have proven to be hauntingly accurate. Rather than withdrawing as promised, Syrian military forces have become more entrenched over the last ten years. Rather than restoring Lebanese sovereignty, Syrian officials asserted direct control over the Lebanese political system. Rather than experiencing a respite from the "disappearances" of the civil war, Lebanese have endured arbitrary arrests and detention by Syrian intelligence.
Despite his continuing exile in France, Aoun has remained the country's most prominent opposition figure. Although support for Aoun is most visible within the Christian community, where criticism of the Syrian occupation is less taboo, he has also retained considerable popularity among Lebanese Muslims in the decade following his ouster. According to a 1996 study by Judith Palmer Harik of the American University of Beirut, Aoun ranked third among Shi'ite respondents asked to name their most preferred Lebanese leader in an open-ended survey. In light of the high religiosity of the Shi'ite community, it is not surprising that two prominent and influential clerical leaders ranked above Aoun. What is surprising is that Aoun ranked above Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, the country's leading Shi'ite politician.9
Until recently, Aoun's followers in Lebanon neglected to establish a highly-structured organization, in part to escape persecution by Syrian and Lebanese intelligence. Around 4,000 "Aounists" have been arrested and detained since 1990. In recent years, as the scale of persecution gradually declined, the movement became consolidated as the Free National Current (Al-Tayyar al-Watani al-Hurr). The FNC has become particularly active in professional and academic circles, counting over 600 teachers, 730 engineers, 300 lawyers and 250 dentists among its members. Since April of last year, the FNC has organized numerous demonstrations drawing thousands of Lebanese into the streets. In addition, FNC student activists have launched a highly successful campaign to protest the continuing presence of nearly 1 million Syrian workers in the country by performing menial labor tasks typically done by Syrians laborers.
As public opposition to Syrian hegemony has intensified since the spring of 1999, Lebanese politicians across the ideological and ethnic spectrum have begun pandering to the public by openly calling for Aoun's return. Most recently, on January 2, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri pledged on state television to "guarantee that he will not be arrested" if he returns to the country. However, Damascus quickly stepped in to thwart the initiative. Sources in Syria say that the Assad regime is not expected to take the risk of permitting Aoun's return in the foreseeable future.
Notes
1 Elie A. Salem, Violence and Diplomacy in Lebanon (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1995), p. 272.
2 Pierre Raffoul, The Betrayal of Lebanon (Lebanese Coordination Bureau of Victoria, October 2000), p. 1-2.
3 R.D. McLaurin, "Lebanon and Its Army: Past, Present, and Future," in Edward E. Azar (ed.), The Emergence of a New Lebanon: Fantasy or Reality? (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), p. 103.
4 In his widely acclaimed study of the Lebanese civil war, historian Theodor Hanf writes: "There can be no doubt about the constitutionality of this government. Article 53 states that the president appoints the ministers, 'one of whom he chooses as prime minister'. The premier does not have to resign; the president can dismiss him and appoint a new prime minister. Moreover, the Aoun government kept the rules of the National Pact. If the presidency is vacant, the cabinet is the sole executive . . . There was a precedent for this: in 1952, President Beshara al-Khoury appointed the commander of the army, Fouad Chehab, who was a Maronite, Prime Minister of an interim government [until elections could be held]." See Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1993), pp. 570-571.
5 The Washington Post, 12 April 1989.
6 The Washington Post, 12 April 1989.
7 Muslim MP Nazim Qadri was assassinated two days before the Ta'if conference convened after making public statements calling for a Syrian withdrawal. During the Ta'if negotiations, a Sunni MP from Tripoli, Abdel Majid al-Rafei, told reporters that "the presence of Syrian troops on Lebanese territory is a contravention of the Arab league charter" and that "since 1976, the Syrian regime has not only interfered [in Lebanon], but also massacred and destroyed cities." Within 24 hours, Syrian forces had arrested around 200 of his followers in and around Tripoli. [Lebanon Central News Agency, 9 October 1989]
8 An advisor to President Hrawi later paraphrased the U.S. message as follows: "If the battle is prolonged, we will have to express our regret over the continued violence in Lebanon. If you fail, we will not condemn the action but call on the Lebanese to resort to dialogue to sort out their differences . . . Israel will not interfere as long as Syria does not approach south Lebanon or threaten [Israel's] security interests." See "US Agreed Not to Block Move By Syria on Aoun, Lebanon Says," The Washington Post, 16 October 1990.
9 See Judith Palmer Harik, "Between Islam and the System: Popular Support for Lebanon's Hizballah," The Journal of Conflict Resolution ( Vol. 40, No. 1), March 1996, p.52.
===============================================================
Debunking the "fleeing" to France myth:
http://forum.tayyar.org/f8/shaker-absi-vs-michel-aoun-marika-vs-rafik-el-hariri-28998/#post609726
Excerpts from the above link:
GMA and the Lebanese Army kept fighting until the Syrian Air Force was given the green light to enter the war, Syrian Air force never had permission to fly over Lebanon (from Israel), the only time they had permission was on October 13 1990, and every Lebanese know that on October 13 1990 Rafik el Hariri was in bed with Hafez el Asad.
.......
On October 11 1990 (2 days before October 13 1990), the Syrian jets flew over Baabda Palace for the first time, they also flew Friday 12 October and launched the attack on Saturday 13 October, on October 11, when the jet flew over the Palace, GMA told the people around him that the moment when the Syrian Air Force launches the attacks, he will ask for a ceasefire.
Saturday morning, the Syrian Air Force launched the attack and GMA contacted the French Ambassador telling him he wants a ceasefire and is ready to negotiate with Elias Hrawi, the Ambassador asked him to go to the embassy because the palace was under Air strike and contacting him is impossible, GMA went to the embassy in a military carrier (known as Melele), the road between the Baabda Palace and the French embassy in Hazmiyeh was a hell, GMA and the convoy survived and reached the embassy, the situation on the road (with Syrian jets in the Sky, PSP artillery, LF artillery and the Syrian artillery) did not allow a "Family trip".
Go read the book written by the French Ambassador "Renne Ala", he in the book explains much better then me what happened that morning, he also explains how when GMA arrived he went out to welcome him, while he was out a rocket hit the embassy and they both were meters away from it.
Go read some history books and read how the French Administration took GMA's life as a National French Pride, the whole world (including your's truly Cheikh Rafik) was cheering for the Syrians burning Lebanon, only the French stood by us, anyway back to the subject, when GMA arrived to the Embassy and told the Ambassador that he is ready to negotiate, the response by Hrawi (Syrains) was that he can not leave the Embassy, and that if he steps out of the embassy (to go back to the Palace), the Syrian jets will finish him off.
===============================================================
Rallying Around the Renegade (Aug 07):
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero082707.html
Rallying Around the Renegade
Heiko Wimmen
August 27, 2007
(Heiko Wimmen is a program manager for the Middle East office of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, a German organization supporting civil society and social movements around the world.)
Back in the fall of 2006, student elections at the American University of Beirut produced an unexpected aesthetic: female campaigners for the predominantly Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of the ex-general Michel Aoun sporting button-sized portraits of bearded Hizballah leader Hasan Nasrallah on their stylish attire. “Hizballah stands for the unity and independence of Lebanon, just as we do,” went the party line, as reiterated by Laure, an activist business student clad in the movement’s trademark orange. “And imagine, the Shi‘a and us,” she mused, off-script and with a glance at her co-campaigners, covered head to toe in the black gowns of the staunchly Islamist party, but spiced up with bright orange ribbons for the occasion. “How many we will be.”
Just how many became clear soon enough, when Aoun joined Hizballah’s attempt to bring down the government of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora through public pressure later that year. While actual numbers are notoriously hard to come by,[1] the two main rallies held on December 1 and 10 clearly rivaled the demonstration that brought about the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon 18 months before. Followers of Aoun, who stand out in their blazing orange gear, accounted for an apparent third of the masses. Once again, predictions that Aoun’s alliance with the “Party of God” would dispel his support in the Christian community were proven wrong.
RETURN OF THE RENEGADE
Throughout his political career, Michel Aoun’s bold maneuvering, boisterous, often ranting discourse and utter disregard for the complex rules and false niceties of the Lebanese political scene have made him one of the most divisive figures therein. To his admirers, he is the strong leader who can rise above the fray of perennial internecine conflict, clear out a divided and despised political class bent on the pursuit of factional and personal interest, and achieve longed-for, but ever elusive national unity. Likewise, Aoun has earned himself the intense loathing (even by Lebanese standards) of the members of exactly this political class (and their followers). Rather than a champion of secularist nationalism, they consider Aoun to be an irresponsible rabble rouser who threatens to upset the delicate balance of sectarian power sharing, and his calls for reform and a shakeup of public institutions to be thinly veiled Bonapartism. Aoun’s loud populism is seen as not only gauche but also a challenge to the country’s Byzantine political game, whereby decisions and distributions of spoils are supposed to be worked out behind impenetrable smokescreens of lofty principles and diplomatic cant. For the Christian part of this political class, he is also an upstart trespassing on territory that is rightfully theirs. “To his supporters,” as one journalist sums it up, “he is a Lebanese Charles de Gaulle seeking to unite this fractious country and rebuild trust in its institutions. To his critics he is a divisive megalomaniac willing to stop at nothing to become president of Lebanon.”[2]
Another constant feature of Aoun’s volatile career is the persistence with which his popular support has bounced back every time his opponents have declared it spent. In 2005, after 15 years in exile, most observers and competitors considered the retired general, then 70, a figure of the past.[3] His announced intention to descend upon Lebanese politics like a “tsunami” was widely derided as being not only in bad taste (coming, as it did, only a few months after the disastrous tsunami in the Indian Ocean), but the delusion of an empire builder who had missed his moment. Already in the 1980s, Aoun’s assertive posture, in contrast to his physical stature, had led wags to give him the nickname “NapolAoun.”
The returned exile was taken lightly in the lead-up to the May-June 2005 parliamentary elections that followed the collapse of the pro-Syrian government and the departure of Syrian troops. In the absence of real political parties -- most parties restrict their activities to organizing support for their powerful, sect-based leader and the field of candidates riding on his ticket -- Lebanese election campaigns are typically dominated by complex bargaining over joined lists and alliances between these confessional chieftains. Expediency is often the only glue keeping such alliances stuck together, though often not far beyond election day. Within the bargaining, the number of “safe” slots offered to a potential ally on a joined list usually reflects his expected electoral strength, or the number of votes that he would be able to mobilize in support of the joined list. During the traditional bazaar in 2005, Aoun was offered a meager seven to eight seats at best in return for joining the unified opposition list. He refused, causing the first major rift in the broad “Syria out!” alliance.
Riding on the wave of mass gatherings peaking with the demonstration of March 14, 2005 -- the date which would provide the name for Lebanon’s current governing coalition -- the alliance forged between Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, the son of the slain former prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri, Saad, and an array of anti-Syrian Christian politicians was confident of winning a parliamentary majority, or even the two thirds of parliamentary seats necessary to impeach President Emile Lahoud,[4] the most stubborn pupil of Syrian tutelage in the country. The March 14 forces even struck a deal with the Shi‘i parties Hizballah and Amal, who had just expressed their gratitude to Syria with a huge demonstration of their own, hoping that Shi‘i votes would tip the balance in enough districts to achieve the coveted two-thirds majority.
Reality intruded during the elections in Mount Lebanon on June 12, when Aoun’s slate of no-names trounced the united opposition list in the Christian heartlands, winning 21 seats and leaving the opposition with only a modest majority (72 out of 128) in the new parliament. To the surprise of everyone, it emerged that a significant majority of the Lebanon’s Christians, and a good percentage of those who had taken to the streets to fight for independence and a Syrian withdrawal only two months before, were actually supporters of Michel Aoun.[5] “Countrywide, Michel Aoun garnered around 42 percent of the Christian vote in 2005,” says Lebanese pollster Abdo Saad. “In some parts of the Christian mountains, that percentage would reach above 70.” Counting political allies in the north and the Bekaa Valley, some two thirds of Lebanon’s Christians were rallying under the orange banners of the renegade general.
PULLING THE LION’S TAIL
One major reason for Aoun’s recurrent mass appeal doubtless lies in his long-standing anti-Syrian credentials. The military resistance he mounted in 1989-1990 to the Saudi-sponsored and US-approved Pax Syriana intended to tamp down the Lebanese civil war turned out to be a costly failure. Yet his warnings against welcoming Syrian involvement in the country were soon enough proven correct. Among Christians, in particular, resentment festered throughout the 1990s over the arbitrary and parasitic reign of the Syrian secret services and their Lebanese stooges. But after the disbanding of the Lebanese Forces, the strongest Christian militia-cum-party during the late 1980s, there were no political structures to organize and feed on this resentment. Aoun did not leave behind a party either when he fled the country, but he did inspire an amorphous movement of mainly young followers. Galvanized by his hyperbolic Lebanese nationalism and his bold confrontation with the feared Syrian regime and the loathed militias, these supporters (with many Muslims among them) eventually imagined the general as a national redeemer, and flocked to the presidential palace by the thousands in late 1989, in order to form a “human shield” against an expected Syrian attack.
After Aoun’s defeat, his backers returned to their universities, from whence they continued political action against the Syrian presence in impromptu networks. While sometimes quixotic or even chauvinist in character -- as with their harassment of migrant Syrian workers and greengrocers -- the Aounists won a reputation of standing tall in the face of the relentless repression of Syrian-controlled government forces and thugs. When the Pax Syriana started to crumble after Hafiz al-Asad’s death in 2000, their university-based networks already stretched into the fourth post-civil war cohort, while many of the activists who had congregated around the presidential palace in 1989 were now urban professionals, often working in communications and the media. Thus, when the time came for action in early 2005, the Aounists were able to field a uniquely effective crowd: experienced in spontaneous, decentralized political action under adverse conditions, media-savvy and endowed with a Westernized veneer that would capture the sympathy of an international audience. Says Khalil, an information technology engineer in his late twenties: “I got involved through friends from the university, who were on these electronic networks. Yes, we wanted to get rid of the Syrians -- that was our goal, and back then, [the Internet] was the only place where you could say that. So that’s where I felt I belonged, and when word was spread that action was supposed to take place here or there, I would go. But I’d never think of becoming a member of a political party.”
While this anti-political, or rather, anti-Establishment, posture found among many Lebanese who grew up during the last years of the civil war resonates with Aoun’s hostile relationship with many Lebanese politicians, some 40,000 Lebanese -- nearly 70 percent of them below the age of 30 -- have decided otherwise, and become card-carrying FPM members through a registration process initiated in late 2006, after the movement officially converted itself into a political party. “All these young people who took to the streets back in 2005 learned one very important thing,” says Sami Ofeish, a political scientist at the University of Balamand in the north of Lebanon. “Politics to them is no longer something that happens on a different planet. They had the experience that if they take action, they can actually make things happen. So one would expect that this generation would develop an attitude very different from that of the preceding years.”
“It was one of the most moving days of my life,” recalls Alain Aoun, the general’s nephew and one of the major party activists, over a cup of coffee in the trendy Christian neighborhood of Gemayzeh. “It showed that Lebanese can come together over an issue, and forget about religion and sects for the sake of the country. That was a very emotional experience.” Switching to the more recent demonstrations mobilized in alliance with Hizballah, his assessment turns significantly more sober: “These rallies prove that if you have leaders who make a conscious effort to find common ground, their followers will be able to meet, even if they have never talked before. Yes, we are very different, culturally, socially -- but those are also people who live in this country. They are one third of the population, and we have to live with them. As long as difference causes offense, this country won’t get anywhere. So this also was a step ahead.”
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS
Beyond such heady arguments in favor of a more inclusive society, one central motive for Aoun’s move toward Hizballah in early 2006 undoubtedly lay in the consistent attempts of the March 14 coalition to freeze the FPM out of the political process even after it emerged as the strongest player in the Christian camp. Just why an alliance that ostensibly saw Syrian influence as the paramount threat to Lebanese sovereignty made no serious effort to coopt such a staunchly anti-Syrian, Lebanese-nationalist partner, and instead formed a government including Hizballah and Amal, who made no secret of their continuing strategic partnership with Damascus, remains something of a mystery. While some may have entertained the optimistic (and, in hindsight, delusional) idea that involving Hizballah in government offered a chance of containing or even redirecting its resistance activity,[6] the difficulty of removing the remaining vestiges of Syrian influence while coopting Syrian allies soon became clear enough. No two-thirds majority materialized to impeach President Lahoud (despite the fact that the parties now making up the government controlled more than four fifths of Parliament), and when the majority pushed for the establishment of an international tribunal to try the assassins of Rafiq al-Hariri (presumably including people high up in the Syrian regime) in late 2005, the Shi‘i ministers responded with a six-week walkout prefiguring the current government crisis.
So what stood in the way of including Aoun instead, a move that would have provided the new government with the support of 93 MPs with no pro-Syrian leanings, well in excess of the desired two-thirds majority? For one thing, it was clear that the FPM would only support an impeachment motion against Lahoud if the name of the one and only candidate to replace the sitting president would be Michel Aoun -- meaning that, rather than filling the position with a compliant nominee of their own, the majority would have had to deal with an independent player with significant popular support. “For all of their anti-Syrian rhetoric, Hariri and Jumblatt preferred to leave Asad’s man in the presidency rather than bow to the wishes of nearly three quarters of the Christian electorate and accept Aoun’s ascension,” concludes Gary Gambill, a seasoned Lebanon analyst with obvious sympathy for the general.[7]
But even without ascension to the presidency, assuming a key government portfolio would have finally allowed Aoun to rid himself of his greatest handicap: the image of erratic brinkmanship he acquired during the war and, in the minds of his opponents, retains (witness his alliance with Hizballah and formerly pro-Syrian politicians). Newly endowed with “stateman-ish” respectability and official leverage and commanding the majority of the Christian popular vote, Aoun would almost certainly have been able to erode the position of his opponents in the Christian camp even further.
HOSTILE BROTHERS IN FAITH
The long-standing mutual antipathy between Michel Aoun and the traditional Christian leadership may have been a key reason why the ruling coalition shunned the FPM. Many observers attribute this animosity to unsettled accounts, in particular between Aoun and the leader of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, the two of whom fought a devastating war in 1989. Both men and their followers, so the argument goes, are still fighting the battles of the past. Considering that in Lebanon not only political office but also political and party allegiance are often hereditary (even in supposedly ideological currents like the Communist Party), such hypotheses seem to make sense at first glance. But they still fail to explain how Aoun’s party was able to wrest such a significant amount of support away from the traditional Christian leadership, represented first and foremost by the Gemayel family, whose scions Bashir and Amin were both presidents of Lebanon. In the 2005 elections, Pierre Gemayel (assassinated in November 2006) scored only 29,412 votes on his family’s home turf, compared to 48,872 for the least successful Aounist candidate, and was only elected to Parliament because the FPM list left one Maronite slot free.
One reason may be the continuous decline of the traditional Christian leadership in the second half of the 1980s, after the assassination of Bashir Gemayel removed the one figure capable of maintaining the precarious alliance between Lebanon’s powerful Christian bourgeoisie (of all denominations) and the increasingly militant Christian lower middle class (mainly Maronite) by means of personal charisma. With his brother Amin increasingly sidelined by the ruthless militia-based leadership of Samir Geagea, and the political project of a Christian-dominated Lebanon under US and Israeli auspices falling apart, more and more Christians despaired of their future in the country. Large-scale displacement of Christians in the mid-1980s (wrought to a great extent by Geagea’s ill-conceived military adventures in the southern parts of Mount Lebanon) also meant that parochial means of mobilizing support would reach fewer and fewer people. The displaced, on the other hand, would either be hell-bent on revenge and join or support the militia, or would turn their resentment against a leadership that had failed them, and become susceptible to the discourses of national redemption that Aoun successfully projected.
“The FPM fared best where there was no locally based Christian leadership,” observes pollster Abdo Saad of the 2005 elections. “Political families like the Gemayels in Matn or the Franjiyyas in the northern province can still hold some ground since they traditionally represent the area. But where people vote for a political program rather than for a political tradition, the FPM swept the Christian constituencies with next to no resistance.”
Preliminary research into the social composition of the FPM and the Lebanese Forces also suggests that class is a defining difference between the groupings in the Christian camp, adding a dynamic to their frequent clashes. The French geographer and anthropologist Beltram Dumontier, who has conducted fieldwork in the Beirut suburb of ‘Ayn al-Rummana, describes the two groups this way: “Youths who do not pursue a university education will often be either unemployed or doing menial jobs. So their social networks, as well as their financial situation, are conducive to making hanging out in the streets of their quarters their main pastime and mode of socializing. And so they get involved in a very male subculture of street life, prone to violence, centered on the idea of ‘defending the quarter,’ and this is how the foot soldiers of the Lebanese Forces are recruited. On the contrary, those who do advance in the educational system spend most of their time away from the neighborhood. Their environment of political socialization is the university, where they meet people from other areas or communities on an equal footing, and where political action will tend to be around more complex issues. I have encountered more than one family where one brother was with the Aounists and the other with the Lebanese Forces, and always the political preference corresponded to education.”
STRUGGLE FOR THE STATE
The profile of a comparatively well-educated and upwardly mobile following, which hence shows a strong preference for meritocracy, sits well with the perennial spiel of the FPM: attacking corruption, and arguing for a strong and efficient state. In contrast to the authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Syria, the corruption and clientelism in Lebanon are actually results of a weak state. Power traditionally resides with an alliance of ruling families who divvy up the state and its prerogatives among one another according to the relative balance of power, and obtain loyalty by redistributing parts of the proceeds among their constituencies. Conventionally, this arrangement is of course described as a “national pact” between religious communities designed to enable coexistence and protect minorities from marginalization. But while Lebanese politicians are always concerned to be seen as vigilant guardians of communal interests, they typically have no problem joining ranks with representatives of other confessions to marginalize their co-religionists. Even long-time foes will suspend their differences as soon as any serious attempt is made to shore up the independence of the state, and join ranks to ward off any such challenge to the order of things. The system is also open to newcomers empowered by political and/or macro-economic change, for instance, Amal leader Nabih Berri, propelled into prominence by Syrian backing in the 1980s or Rafiq al-Hariri, elevated by petrodollars and Saudi patronage in the 1990s. Such newcomers may push out some of the traditional players, but are usually careful to preserve the rules of the game.
Politicians speaking about the national interest, the constitutional process or the integrity of institutions are rarely doing more than paying lip service, and are typically using these concepts as weapons in the eternal struggle for more influence and positions, which can then be used to twist the rules of the game even more in one’s favor, so as to dole out even more government favors to one’s followers. A classic example is the paving of roads in rural areas in election years, expected to translate into votes for the candidate whose “influence” in the capital supposedly enabled him to “secure” such services, and to discourage votes for less well-connected challengers. Politicians of this type are referred to as “asphalt MPs” in local vernacular, a play on the double meaning of the Arabic word for asphalt (zift), which also means “dirt” or “crap.”
“When my son left high school, there was an opening for some 200 recruits in General Security,” recalls a Sunni from Beirut. “We found out that some 70 would go to Sunnis. And to get one of those, you needed to go to Rafiq al-Hariri. It was as simple as that: Sunni jobs are distributed by the strongest Sunni leader. So we used a contact to a person very close to Hariri, and things worked out. After that, we all became his followers. Because if he doesn’t care for us, then nobody else will.” In Lebanon, everybody knows at least ten stories of this category, and while contempt for the politicians involved is universal, so is the urge not to be left behind in the scramble for the spoils. Yet Alain Aoun is determined that the rules of the games must be changed: “Until now, the logic is: I take office, so now it is my turn to steal and patronize my people. We need to break this cycle. A few honest guys on the top level can make a hell of a difference, and send a message down through the ranks.”
The most capable and honest guy to initiate this process, one infers, will be nobody but the general himself. Drawing on his personal history as a career officer who rose up from poverty due to diligence and integrity (Aoun famously had to skip a year of high school due to lack of funds and made up for it by squeezing the curriculum of two years into one), Michel Aoun is presented as an unlikely Hercules uniquely qualified to clean out the Augean stable of Lebanese politics.
That might be easier said than done, agrees his nephew, after weathering several cell phone calls from party affiliates trying to arrange for jobs at Orange TV, a new Arabic-language TV station set up by the FPM. “See, this guy who just called wants me to hire a girl who has a degree in theater and no experience in TV. I have no problem to arrange an interview for her, but that’s not what he expects from me. He doesn’t want me to give her a fair chance. He wants me to give her a job without any competition or check of her qualifications. To eradicate such a mentality will take a long time, but you have to start somewhere, and that somewhere is at the top of the pyramid. If the rulers are corrupt, and not even ashamed, then what do you expect from society?”
Often dismissed as sheer populism, the FPM’s call for imposing transparency and stamping out corruption and clientelism -- however realistic an objective it may or may not be -- thus threatens to disrupt the very system on which the power structure is built. With trademark exaggeration, Michel Aoun vowed to “confront political feudalism” upon his return from France in May 2005. While clearly a swipe at the likes of Walid Jumblatt (who happens to be the heir of a “real” feudal line), Saad al-Hariri and Amin Gemayel, such pronouncements cannot have been pleasing to any of the politicians who prefer the rules of the games as they are. As Gambill puts it: “FPM control of a major ministry is a red line for the [March 14] coalition mainly because Aoun would have absolutely nothing to lose by acting on his pledges to clean up government, even if his motives are completely self-serving.”
While potentially endangering vested interests, a program emphasizing transparency and meritocracy is likely to appeal to the educated middle classes forming the backbone of the FPM, whose life chances are hampered by systemic clientelism and sectarian red tape that often extends into the private sector. Barred from many attractive jobs for lack of connections, unable to initiate meaningful economic activity of their own for lack of capital and, again, lack of opportunities in an environment where many market segments are controlled by fat cats who easily squeeze out new competitors, they stand to gain from any change. Accordingly, the economic outlook of the FPM shows conservative or even neo-liberal leanings, with a high premium on encouraging free competition, world market integration and downsizing a state bureaucracy bloated by clientelism. “Aoun’s followers are those who lose out in the Lebanese clientelist system,” concludes Dumontier, “not those who are near the bottom of the social ladder. The latter need protection to get their very modest jobs and benefits, and wasta (connections) for them is a matter of survival. And not those on the top level, either -- they are the ones who hold the keys, and more transparency would take away from their power. It is those who could do better for themselves if the system were to become more open and meritocratic.”
SECTARIAN SECULARISTS
Still, and despite the secularist rhetoric wielded by Aoun and his lieutenants, one of the most important cards for the FPM among its predominantly Christian following appears to be the sense of being once again excluded in the post-civil war political order -- only this time, and worse, not by the Syrians, who were, after all, outsiders and occupiers. This time the Aounists feel marginalized by other Lebanese and, still worse, by nobody less than their age-old nemesis, the Sunnis, manifest in the overbearing presence of the Hariri family and its political machinery, the Future Movement. Secularism as professed by the Aounists thus shows a tendency to turn into a sectarian discourse[8] directed mainly against a perceived Sunni takeover of state institutions, and prone to resurrect the eternal Christian fear of being “drowned” in a sea of more than 250 million Muslim Arabs surrounding Lebanon, the only country in the region to guarantee them full legal equality.
The “mother of all injustices” against Christians quoted by supporters of the FPM is the election law, drawn up in the year 2000 by the chief of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon, the late Ghazi Kanaan, and applied again in 2005. Designed with the clear intention of minimizing the impact of the notoriously anti-Syrian Christian electorate, the Kanaan law “diluted” the Christian vote in many districts by combining Christian with significantly more populous Muslim areas.[9] As a result, only 18 out of 64 Christian MPs were elected in majority-Christian districts, while the remaining Christian MPs were practically elected by Muslims -- Sunnis and hence Hariri in the north and Beirut, Shi‘a and hence Hizballah and Amal in the south, Druze and Shi‘a in the southern part of Mount Lebanon. There is irony in the fact that what was meant to further Syrian interest back in 2000 -- largely by favoring Hariri, who was then still a loyal supporter of the Pax Syriana -- vastly skewed the results in favor of the anti-Syrian coalition in 2005.
Such irony, however, was completely lost on the majority of Christians represented by the FPM. From their perspective, the election of 2005 and its aftermath only continued their post-war decline, a process marked by Muslim-dominated governments with fig leaves of Christian participation. This impression was reinforced by the less than impressive performance of the Christian representatives in the Siniora government. Saudi money (the younger Hariri holds Saudi citizenship, and his business network is entwined with Saudi interests), it was induced, had replaced the tutelage of the Syrian secret services, with the blessing of the US, who would sign Lebanon over to a regional power it needed for greater designs, just as it did in 1990 when Syria was an indispensable part of the coalition to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. So pervasive became this impression that the Conference of Maronite Bishops felt compelled to issue a stern warning against an impending “Islamization” of Lebanon in late June, and Samir Geagea was quoted (and promptly denied) saying, “I don’t even talk to the Saudis. I talk to their masters, the Americans, and they talk to them on our behalf.”
From the perspective of Christians close to Aoun, however, talking to the Americans was pointless, for the Sunni ascendancy was seen as not at all accidental, but rather part of a strategic realignment that puts Sunni Arab regimes, and in particular Saudi Arabia, at the center of a pro-US alliance against purported radicals. “In the fall of 2005, Washington was facing a stark choice of what to support in Lebanon,” wrote Jean Aziz, who has since become the director of Orange TV. “It could choose either a pluralist, consensual system that may have set an example for the dialogue rather than the clash of civilizations, or a Sunni Muslim system with American leanings and pliant to American interests, a model for American presence in the region.”[10]
But then why turn to Hizballah, another party with a clearly Muslim character, and with a political agenda liable to embroil Lebanon deeper and further in regional struggles, something Lebanese Christians have always been loath to do? For Aoun’s detractors, the answer is simple and straightforward: Both Shi‘a and Christians are tiny minorities in a region dominated by Sunnis. In a system where sectarian considerations trump everything else, their alliance against a powerful Sunni-dominated regime now backed by Lebanon’s Sunni neighbors appears almost natural. With only 30-40 percent of the population, and with non-Arab Iran as its main sponsor, Lebanon’s Shi‘a have no hope of ever dominating the system, unlike the Sunnis, who draw economic and demographic strength from neighboring countries such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan or Saudi Arabia, all liable to be controlled by Islamists in the not too distant future. Additionally, Hizballah, with its disciplined fighting units, appears less scary in comparison to Sunni extremists such as Fatah al-Islam, who have been battling the Lebanese army for three months in the refugee camp of Nahr al-Barid, after allegedly being under the protection of the Hariri family -- developments dwelt upon by media sympathetic to the FPM.
Alain Aoun does not deny his misgivings about the Sunnis throwing their weight around, but insists that the intentions behind the alliance with Hizballah go beyond sectarian zero-sum games: “One, this country needs to be governed in a very delicate way, and putting only one group in the driver’s seat is a sure recipe for disaster. Two, at the end of the day you need to sit down and talk out all these issues: Under which conditions would Hizballah give up these weapons? How are we supposed to deal with Syria and Israel? We have tried to do exactly that, and the memorandum of understanding that we signed with them contains some positive commitments from their side. Does anybody have a better idea? Does anybody seriously believe that by isolating and pressuring Hizballah, or even threatening them with force, you can make them give up their weapons and behave like a normal political party? I surely hope not.”
EPILOGUE
The narrow victory scored by Aoun’s candidate in the Matn by-election on August 5, 2007 showed the Christian community to be deeply divided, with both sides claiming moral victory. Judging by the numbers, support for the FPM was dented (40,000 votes, about one third less than the 2005 result), while support for the pro-government Christian camp went up (also by one third). Yet the virtually unknown FPM candidate entered the race in a clearly uphill battle: For one thing, he confronted no less a personage than Amin Gemayel, a former president and the head of one of the most influential Christian families in Lebanon, and on his home turf, giving his opponent ample opportunity to mobilize along parochial and tribal lines. Second, he was running against the father of the MP whose assassination made the by-election necessary in the first place, lending his bid an air of callousness, as many voters felt that the seat rightfully belonged to the family of the murdered man. Finally, the assassination was widely ascribed to remnants of the Syrian secret service network in Lebanon, and Aoun’s attempt to, as it were, reap political gain from the killing provided ample ammunition for portraying his movement as unwittingly or opportunistically paving the way for renewed Syrian influence in Lebanon.
“This is the most damaging accusation,” says pollster Abdo Saad. “The polls show that Aoun’s supporters have no problem with Hizballah as such. What they mind is Hizballah’s attachment to Syria. They have no problem with Aoun’s political decisions, but they take issue with his alliances with formerly pro-Syrian forces. My own wife, who is Christian, used to be all-out for Aoun, but now, the media campaign portraying him as pro-Syrian has succeeded to turn her against him.”
Yet the fact that, at the end of a long election day, Amin Gemayel was unable to capitalize upon these considerable advantages shows that the core support for the FPM remains resilient, and makes it appear unlikely that any force in the Christian camp will be able to challenge Michel Aoun’s position in the near future. For Lebanon, this appears to be a mixed blessing at best: On the one hand, a (most likely sizable) majority of the Christian community seems prepared to look for guarantees of their presence in a majority-Muslim country and an overwhelmingly Muslim region in the institutions of a secular state, rather than hanging on to the doubtful security offered by a ghetto of sectarian privilege. This is a momentous development, when one recalls the 1970s. Yet the party galvanizing such sentiment feels compelled to appeal, once again, to sentiments that all too obviously feed on longing for lost privilege and resentment of the arch-competitor for power in the state. Likewise, for the first time in their history, a (probably less sizable) majority of Christians is prepared to make common political cause with a mass movement following an explicitly Islamist political outlook. And yet it appears that prejudice and racism against Muslims, mixed with resentment deriving from class, have been transposed onto Sunnis and only muted toward Shi‘a, for the time being. Despite the remarkable politicization of young Lebanese that fueled the success of the FPM, the new party also remains a movement centered around a single leader, who is venerated to the verge of personality cult, with a notable tendency to establish a strong family presence in the top echelons, and again, despite a significant number of female activists, to exclude women nearly totally from the upper ranks.
Finally, the inconclusive test of forces between Amin Gemayel and Michel Aoun bodes ill for the already intractable conflict over the upcoming election of a new president -- a post traditionally reserved for Maronite Christians -- where both men are candidates. Without a compromise, the presidency, which also wields the high command of the armed forces, may be the next victim of the chain reaction of stalemate, disputed legitimacy and mutual boycott that has already paralyzed most of the political institutions in Lebanon. A further disintegration of the state now looks like a real possibility.
[1] Ever since mass demonstrations in Lebanon began, in the wake of ex-Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri’s assassination in the spring of 2005, all sides have engaged in inflation of numbers to absurd proportions, without any serious regard to material facts, such as the actual surface area of the spots where people congregated. Interview with Lebanese pollster Abdo Saad, Beirut, June 2007. Saad is the director of the Beirut Center for Research and Information (http://www.beirutcenter.info, mainly in Arabic), which conducts frequent opinion polls on political issues.
[2] Hassan Fattah, “Lebanon Divided on Presidential Hopeful Michel Aoun,” International Herald Tribune, January 19, 2007.
[3] Such disregard finds its reflection in the lack of any serious research on the “Aoun phenomenon” thus far -- an omission that this article can only hope to start addressing. This article is based on a series of interviews with party officials and activists conducted in June 2007, in addition to party literature, encounters with activists since the spring of 2005, particularly during the mass demonstrations in December 2006, and preliminary results of a field study conducted in the spring of 2007 by the French geographer Beltram Dumontier in ‘Ayn al-Rummana (a predominantly Maronite Christian quarter of Beirut adjacent to the Hizballah strongholds of Shiyah and Harat Hurayk), which Dumontier generously shared with the author.
[4] It is a point of contention whether the Lebanese constitution actually allows Parliament to impeach a sitting president by any kind of majority. Since a two-thirds majority was not available anyway, attempts at exploring the legal dimension were soon abandoned.
[5] Again, there are no reliable figures as to what extent the Aounist movement contributed to this movement. If the huge turnout attending Aoun’s return from exile on May 7, 2005 is anything to go by, however, it appears safe to assume that the demonstrations in February and March would have looked significantly less impressive without their participation. March 14 is also the anniversary of Aoun’s abortive “war of liberation” (from Syria) launched in 1989 and annually celebrated by his followers.
[6] According to Hizballah, there has been more than one US offer to broker a deal that would trade Hizballah’s weapons for a significant improvement of Shi‘i representation in the political system. Interview with Hizballah expert Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, October 2006. Such ideas resurfaced in the wake of the 2006 war in the columns of government loyalists. See Michael Young, “Offer Reform for Hizballah’s Weapons,” Daily Star, September 28, 2006.
[7] Gary Gambill, “Lemons from Lemonade: Washington and Lebanon After the Syrian Withdrawal,” Mideast Monitor (June-July 2007). http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0705/0705_1.htm.
[8] Such was also the case in the 1970s, when Lebanese Muslims argued for secularism in order to do away with the constitutional privileges accorded to Christians.
[9] The law provides for a first-past-the-post majority system differentiated by sect. For instance, one seat in the district Beirut-I was reserved for a Greek Orthodox Christian, so the Orthodox candidate with the most votes would win one seat, and all votes cast for other Orthodox candidates would have no impact on the composition of Parliament. As in most majority systems, gerrymandering has the potential to distort the popular vote, and has been a temptation for sitting presidents and governments ever since the foundation of Lebanon. Accordingly, each and every parliamentary election in Lebanon is preceded by heated debate about how electoral districts will be demarcated, with the decision typically taken only shortly before election day.
[10] Al-Akhbar, July 28, 2007.
===============================================================
I thank God I live in the Era of Michel Aoun
(Dec 08):
http://www.ualm.org.au/editorials.php?editorials=40
I thank God I live in the era of Michel Aoun
By Labib Chemali - 8th December 2008
Few figures throughout the pages of historical account have been able to stand out from the rest whilst maintaining their Integrity and Honour; I have had the privilege to meet with such a figure, General Michel Aoun (Lebanon’s Former Army Chief, Prime Minister and current Member of Parliament).A quick glance at his history shows that he has worked tirelessly behind the scenes to hold together the Lebanese Army in the 1970’s, 1980’s and contributed to thwarting the regional plan to topple the Government of Lebanon and have it transformed into a substitute homeland for the Palestinians at the expense of the Indigenous Lebanese population.
At the end of the 1980’s when he was appointed as Prime Minister of Lebanon he worked on rebuilding the Lebanese state; free of militias and free of the Syrian and Israeli military occupation of this small Eastern Mediterranean Nation.
He fought for a Free, Sovereign Independent Lebanon and was thusly exiled by joint Syrian Army and a multiple Lebanese Militia military offensive that had the blessing of the International Community all the while insisting that he wanted the best relations with Syria; so long as it was out of Lebanon. He was able to inspire Lebanese of all faiths and denominations to rally around a United and Sovereign Lebanon.
During his 15 year exile he campaigned tirelessly; his testimony to the United States Congress and his diligent work resulted in the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, and later United Nations Resolution 1559 in 2004.
These acts drew the ire of the ruling class that had embedded itself as Lebanon’s post war “mafiaocrisy” for it was during his 15 years exile from 1990 to 2005 that corruption was institutionalised and the Christians of Lebanon were marginalised. His work secured the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005 (a withdrawal that was accelerated to early 2005 as a result of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s assassination in February 14 2005).
He returned to Lebanon to a hero’s welcome, stepping foot on Lebanese soil only after the last Syrian soldier had left Lebanon. He went about crafting a new vision for Lebanon of Change and Reform so that Lebanon would not fall to the same pitfalls as it had in the past. He was deserted by his new found “allies” that had found a spine once the Syrians withdrew from Lebanon, ironically the very people who were Syria’s prime advocates during its military presence.
It is significant to note that his most fierce critics against the stand that he took, and continues to take are the very proponents of foreign intervention in Lebanon and once camped out on the doorsteps of Syrian leaders in order to secure places for themselves in the Lebanese Parliament and Cabinet; they used to shower the Syrian occupation with praises and tenaciously defend its presence at the expense of their own people and their own country. We are still unsure to this day whether it is the fear of Change and Reform which would inevitably threaten the pockets of this ruling class or the preference for foreign intervention as a means to subjugate their own people and thus cement their positions of leadership; as a genuine democracy in Lebanon seems would strip them of that right. My belief is that it is a combination of both.
In 2006 Aoun signed the historic Memorandum of Understanding with Hezbollah that addressed all of Lebanon’s problems off the last 30 years including Hezbollah’s eventual disarmament. During the July war of 2006 he encouraged the Christian population take the million plus refugees into their homes; most of whom were of the Shiite faith for the duration of the war, a move that embedded national unity in the Lebanese psyche even further.
2007 signified his signing of the Christian Pact aimed at restoring the traditional Christian role in Lebanon and the East and the following year he led the opposition to achieving a fair electoral law, opposed to the previous laws that gerrymandered the electoral districts and deprived Christian voters of electing their own representatives.
In 2008 he visited Iran and met with many Christian figures in the Islamic Republic highlighting their right to live in dignity and with free will to practice their faith. He has recently made the trek to Syria, his former foe (on the premise Syria had agreed to establish Diplomatic Relations with Lebanon and accept it as a Sovereign State) with his head held high, as an equal - to candidly discuss the many outstanding issues from Lebanon’s war which spanned from 1975 to 1990. These issues include the rejection of permanently settling the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon and the fate of the Lebanese Nationals that are believed to be missing in Syrian jails.
His reception in Syria was as profound as it was grand, where we saw the streets of Syria lined with Lebanese Flags and the populace greeted him with the fan fare of a true historical leader. He visited numerous holy sites in Syria, ancient Monasteries, Churches and the great Umayyad Mosque where he was hosted by the Mufti of the Syrian Republic.
Syria’s sizable Christian population came out en masse to greet him as he has cemented the right of Christians to live in the East, the birthplace for all three of the world’s major religions. What Aoun is working towards is not new, what is new however is his ability to stand true to his word after so many years and achieve tangible results on the ground.
There will come a time in the East where like in the West we can see Churches, Mosques, Synagogues and Temples lined side by side on the street; with coexistence and the right to live in dignity a secured right of the populace, and we will look back at this period in history and thank God we lived in the era of Michel Aoun.
Labib Chemali
The United Australian Lebanese Movement
===============================================================
Aoun - a man of courage (written by me) Mar 09:
http://www.tayyar.org/Tayyar/News/Opinions/viewopinion.htm?id=1657
Courage is to fight an occupying force for nationalistic purposes, not for personal vengeance. (e.g. Geagea post 94)
Courage is to fight the occupying forces while they are in your homeland, not when they have left (ie the newly converted anti-syrians. ahhh ya tarazan!).
Courage is the realisation of when to go to war and when to go to peace and foster new chapter of relations, not as master-slave relations, but on mutual respect and as equals.
Courage is when you open your hand to those willing to accept it in the hope of internal and external reconciliation, even after being victimised at their hands.
Courage is when you build bridges of dialogue, understanding, respect and trust with those you have contrasting views, and find middle ground and compromise for the sake of a nation, for the sake of human value, and for the sake of internal civil peace.
Courage is when you have self-confidence in your political choices, no matter who is fighting against you.
Courage is when you remain steadfast to your vision and cause in the face of internal and external pressures.
Courage is not about kneeling to the boot of another, but about keeping the dignity of the people and the nation.
===============================================================
The Tayyar Party’s Quest for Peace
(Sept 07)
New Voices in Lebanon
Brenda Heard - 20/09/2007
There was nothing “civil” about the war suffered by Lebanon 1975—1990. Religious sects were pitted against each other. The have’s battled the have-not’s. Neighbouring countries and countries faraway pushed for power wherever they could take it. Lebanon was teeming with frustration, struggle, death, distrust. There seemed no way out of the anguish that perpetuated the fighting. The war, of course, did come to a close, but the anguish lingered on as an undercurrent in the rebuilding of Lebanon.
Out of the turmoil was proposed a novel solution: an autonomous Lebanon whose government represented and supported all Lebanese. With hope pinned on the concept of a respectful co-existence—equality of rights and benefits for all Lebanese citizens—a movement was born before its time. Its leading proponent, General Michel Aoun, was forced into political exile by the Syrian army and its Lebanese allies.
It took another 15 years to see the expulsion of the Syrian presence in Lebanon. When General Aoun returned to his homeland, he found a nation still simmering with frustration, struggle, death, and distrust. Aoun and his supporters offered Lebanon a break from the past. In September 2005, the Free Patriotic Movement was declared a political party. Known in Arabic as “Al tayyar al watany al hor,” the party is commonly known as Tayyar. It is based on the fundamental worth of a diverse society working together for the good of all. In a country struggling for peace, security, and stability, the Free Patriotic Movement was a new voice that offered Lebanon a way forward.
Tayyar presented its platform from a novel perspective: thinking in terms of one Lebanon. Since the beginning, each group of Lebanese had clung to its own identity as being the “true Lebanese,” and had considered the other Lebanese citizens as interlopers. This egocentric myopia had led to inevitable conflict. Tayyar suggested, however, that if all Lebanese had equal rights, freedom and dignity, then they could engage in constructive dialogue rather than war. Cooperation and dialogue would form the basis of a strong democracy. A strong Lebanese government could stand on equal footing with governments of other countries rather than being manipulated by them.
Soon after announcing its platform, Tayyar began to practice what it preached. After a period of extensive dialogue, the parties of Tayyar and Hezbollah published a “Paper of Common Understanding.” The two parties together presented ten solutions to major issues threatening the future stability of Lebanon. (Please see full document below) (1) The solutions were practical means of reaching not only stable, peaceful relations with its neighbouring countries, but indeed of reaching long-term peace for all of Lebanon.
As Aoun explains, however, their proposals for peace were not welcomed: “Our party presented this solution internally to all Lebanese political groups, the Lebanese government, and the international community—including the U.S. administration—repeatedly, for an entire year before this crisis [the 2006 war] began. Rather than help us to resolve the [Resistance] weapons issue peacefully and avoid the current agony our country is now enduring, the international community and Lebanese government flatly ignored the proposed solution.”(2) Just five months after the dialogue initiative, Israel launched the summer’s war.
Weeks into the war, as Bush and Rice were quoted endlessly saying that there could be no ceasefire (that is, that they would continue to back Israeli attacks on Lebanon) until there was a chance for a lasting, an endurable, a sustainable peace, (3) Aoun pointed out that “Considering that this crisis could have been avoided, and considering that there is—and has been—a solution almost begging to be made, one cannot but conclude that all of this death, destruction and human agony will, in retrospect, be adjudged as having been in vain. No matter how much longer this fight goes on, the truth of the matter is that political negotiations will be the endgame. The solution that will present itself a week, a month or a year from now will be, in essence, the same solution as the one available today, and which, tragically, was available before a single shot was fired or a single child killed.” (4) This war, too, did come to a close. But once again, the anguish lingered on as an undercurrent in the next rebuilding of Lebanon. In actuality, the war had merely shifted from overt hostility to covert aggression.
Flatly ignored in their efforts toward peace before the 2006 war, Tayyar, together with several other political parties, rallied in public protest in Beirut. On 1/12/06 when the demonstration began, Aoun explained their action: “We do not seek to isolate [the ministers in Grand Serail] and we do not seek to monopolize power. Nor do we seek to obtain personal or even sectarian interests. . . . It is a shame and a disgrace to separate between a confession and another as we have met under the Lebanese flag and we are proud of this; in front of the entire world we are not ashamed of our national principles. . . . I call on you to support our mission of change and reform and the preservation of free decision making and of the rights of the Lebanese people, all the Lebanese people. The rights of the Lebanese people should not be subjected to favoritism and confessionalism or political affiliation. These are absolute rights that all the governments should safeguard and for all the people, supporters and opponents. . . . Today we are suffering from an isolation campaign waged against us as if those in power intend to create a confrontation. But we do not want this confrontation. We seek openness in order to reach a national unity in which all the Lebanese people take part.” (5)
Their call for reform, with its massive public support, however, was chided by various elements of the Lebanese government, who relied on the clout of foreign alliances, just as had occurred during the “civil” war. The US, the UK and Saudi Arabia were all quick to denounce as “undemocratic” that the people should voice concerns over their own government. (6) The US, in particular, announced its intention to destroy any movement within Lebanon that would dare to challenge the status quo of the existing Lebanon government. (7) Saad Hariri dismissed the significance of the people’s demonstration: “No matter how long they stay in the street this will not bring down the government.”(8)
Siniora’s response was that “Lebanon's independence is threatened and its democratic system is in danger." (9)
The people who carried their Lebanese flags to Beirut in an effort to resolve issues within Lebanese internal government found themselves accused by the Western World of being saboteurs. But having just literally swept up the rubble from the recent Western-backed war against their country, they were convinced more than ever of their right to carry their Lebanese flags. Aoun expressed the irony of the situation: “we find ourselves receiving advice from the great minds of democracy in the world to work within the Constitutional institutions that have become, thanks to the Government, devoid of any content. This is why we have to return the advice with appreciation and remind them that Beirut, the Mother of Laws, knows very well how to interpret constitutions and laws. Beirut does not require guidance but rather to be free of interference in its affairs… So we ask you all to stop interfering and allow us, at least, to deal with our affairs slightly more than you do.” (10)
This new initiative for a break with the anguish and violence of the past was, just like the previous initiative, ignored. On 30 March 2007, therefore, Aoun wrote a letter of concern to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon; the letter was also sent to all Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. (Please see full letter below) (11) Not only did Aoun outline yet again the grounds for concern for Lebanese internal government, he made it clear that international interference was a hindrance to resolving those issues peacefully through dialogue: “Despite the illegitimacy of, and the lack of confidence by the majority of the Lebanese people in, the Siniora Government and its incapability to rule the country, it has been receiving unlimited and irrational support from the international community. Given such empowerment, the current Siniora Government is not interested in any effort toward resolving the crisis in Lebanon through dialogue. The international community appears to be taking side in an internal dispute related to democratic rules and the Lebanese Constitution, and runs the risk of shouldering a big responsibility in case the country reaches a governance vacuum or internal conflict at the end of current President term.”
Aoun received no direct response to his request for mutual cooperation. Once again, his offer to “contribute to a permanent solution to the current crisis” was ignored. It is perhaps even more worrisome, however, that the UN virtually dismissed Aoun’s warning of a specific threat to the security of Lebanon: government-approved armed militias. There had developed, Aoun advised, the “establishment and expansion in Lebanon of fundamentalist terrorist organizations with no preventive measures on the part of the Siniora Government” and the “arming and training of previous militias and new ones, all affiliated with the governing majority, under the sight of the Siniora Government.”
In the United Nations Security Council report dated 7 May 2007, Ban Ki-moon gives a perfunctory reply: “In recent months, there has been no discussion among Lebanese political leaders about such a political process leading to the disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. On the contrary, in the context of the enduring crisis, there have been mounting reports and increasing media speculation that a variety of Lebanese groups are expanding their existing weapons arsenals or are reacquiring a weapons capacity. . . . I have noted above and in my recent report (S/2007/147) the assertion put forward by the Syrian Arab Republic that some Lebanese groups are receiving arms from Israel. There has also been media speculation that Israel and other parties inside and outside the region are providing weaponry to groups aligned with the 14 March movement. The United Nations has not received any evidence substantiating such claims.” (12)
Ban Ki-moon refers to his “concern over a growing threat from extremist Islamist groups, who have reportedly found safe haven in Palestinian refugee camps, to the presence of the United Nations in Lebanon. The presence and reportedly growing strength of such groups stands in direct contradiction to resolution 1559 (2004) and is deeply disconcerting, threatening not only the United Nations presence, but also undermining the Government of Lebanon’s exertion of authority and its monopoly on the use of force throughout its territory.” He was apparently not, then, concerned that these groups were a threat to the Palestinians residing in those camps or indeed to the Lebanese people outside the camps. His concern was for the UNIFIL and for the lack of the Lebanese government to control such groups—which he goes on to identify as Syrian, despite the fact that he acknowledges their leader has an outstanding arrest warrant (for murder) in Syria. (13)
Ban Ki-moon then dismisses the issue: “As concerns the Palestinian militias in Lebanon, there has been no progress or action towards the disarming and disbanding of such groups. My Special Representative has continued his dialogue with the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon, who is also in close contact with the Lebanese authorities on all issues of mutual concern.” While acknowledging UNIFIL’s report of unauthorized armed personnel, “Palestinian armed elements, who are largely confined to the refugee camps,” Ban Ki-moon apparently deemed this side-line discussion sufficient. The bulk of his report worries about the weapons of the Resistance and the role of Syria in Lebanese affairs.
Since the ceasefire following the summer 2006 war, the Resistance has not used any weapon. In the same time period, Al Qaeda-inspired Fatah al-Islam has been responsible at the very least for the deaths of four Lebanese in the Ain Alak bus bombing (just prior to Aoun’s letter to the UN), and over 200 Palestinians and Lebanese in Tripoli during over three months of battles in and around the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp. (There were also at least 131 Fatah al-Islam militants of various nationalities killed.) The camp battles began less than two months after Aoun’s letter to the UN.
Tayyar had been ignored, derided and denounced by the 14 March alliance. Tayyar, however, was committed to its goals and confident of its support among the Lebanese people. When it was announced that there would be a special by-election on 5 August 2007 to fill the Parliament seat vacated by the assassination of Pierre Gemayel, Lebanon held its breath. The by-election in Metn, a Christian area northeast of Beirut, was charged with emotion. Running for the Phalange Party was former Lebanese president Amin Gemayel, father of Pierre Gemayel. Running for the Tayyar Party was a physician virtually unknown by the public, Kamil Khoury.
The Phalange Party put forth the idea that to vote for Amin Gemayel was to vote against the assassins of Pierre. (To date the killing is an unsolved crime) Photo posters of Pierre were prominently displayed in the constituency. A petition by key social and business names pronounced that the voters had a moral responsibility to support Amin in order to condemn the assassination. Phalange supporters handed out commemorative white roses to the voters. (14) Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir declared that "parliamentary seats being disputed belonged to people who have been assassinated by merciless criminals." (15)
Tayyar, of course, had long since made its position on assassination clear: “Any form of political assassination is condemned and rejected because of its violation of basic human rights and of the most important foundations of the existence of Lebanon represented by difference and diversity, and of the essence of democracy and its practice.” (16) Tayyar had not, in fact, been connected in any way with Pierre’s assassination. Aoun patiently responded to these tactics by saying, “"We would like the election campaign to proceed calmly - this campaign is not aimed at any individuals but has a clear political basis." (17)
Polls indicated that the constituency was clearly divided, with a marginal percentage supporting Tayyar. (18) Just days before the election, the US stepped up the pressure. On 1 August 2007, Bush signed an executive order that authorized the US Treasury Department to freeze the financial assets of anyone deemed harmful to the Siniora government: "I, George Bush, President of the United States of America, determine that the actions of certain persons to undermine Lebanon's legitimate and democratically elected government or democratic institutions, to contribute to the deliberate breakdown in the rule of law in Lebanon, including through politically motivated violence and intimidation, to reassert Syrian control or contribute to Syrian interference in Lebanon, or to infringe upon or undermine Lebanese sovereignty contribute to political and economic instability in that country and the region and constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, and I hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat," (19)
As the 14 March alliance (including Gemayel) is what Bush considers Lebanon’s “legitimate and democratically elected government,” then to oppose that alliance would presumably mean casting oneself as a threat to US national security. On 5 August, however, the Lebanese people in the Metn constituency voted for Lebanese national security; they voted for Tayyar.
The Phalange Party was quick to claim victory even though they had lost the seat in Parliament. 57% of Maronite voters supported Gemayel, while only 47% of Maronite voters supported Khoury. Gemayel stated he was worried because Tayyar won 80% of Armenian voters, 97% of Shiite voters and 50% of Sunni voters. He was concerned that "These figures prove that the Muslims supported Aoun and backed his candidate." (20)
What these figures prove, however, is that Tayyar was able to garner support from voters across the board. Tayyar appealed to their sense of inclusiveness, their sense of being Lebanese. As Aoun said, “The call for Christian unity is a provocation. . . . There are always a majority and minority in the logic of democracy. Unanimity is manifested by dictatorship. . . . We do not want external interference. We have a democratic system that we ought to respect.” (21) Aoun has consistently voiced his support for an autonomous Lebanon that respects and nurtures all religious affiliations among its people.
As a Tayyar supporter explained, the call for national unity is not about gaining personal power, but about gaining peace and security: “All Lebanese live in one country called the Republic of Lebanon. Those who seek to preserve it, preserve it for everyone. Those who seek to undermine any community within it by aligning with foreign elements against that community, undermine it for all – including themselves.” (22) For many Lebanese, then, Tayyar ticks all the boxes.
Patriotic Movement
February 6, 2006 tayyar.org
http://www.tayyar.org/files/documents/fpm_hezbollah.pdf
(2) “History Will Judge Us All On Our Actions,” Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115429780106621697.html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep
(3) 2 samples: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14018618/ ; http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-07/2006-07-31-voa20.cfm?CFID=205025436&CFTOKEN=30222127
(4) “History Will Judge Us All On Our Actions,” Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115429780106621697.html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep
(5) full text of speech at http://www.voltairenet.org/article144278.html
(6) http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article658323.ece
(7) US President Bush stated “The United States has staunchly supported the Siniora government” and states that “Any attempt to destabilize Lebanon's democratically-elected government through such tactics as manufactured demonstrations. . .would, at the very least, be a clear violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1559, 1680, and 1701.” He then delivered $10.5 million in military goods to fulfil his pledge that the CIA and other US intelligence agencies would fund anti-Hezbollah groups in Lebanon and pay for activists who support the Siniora government (http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=36467; and http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/11/20061101-1.html; and http://beirut.usembassy.gov/lebanon/PRrodmen.html; and http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/01/10/wleb10.xml; and http://theswoop.net/sys/article.php?art_ID=1031&color=1)
(8) http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article658323.ece
(9) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6197992.stm
(10) http://www.tayyar.org/tayyar/articles.php?article_id=23942&type=GMA
(11) Aoun letter to UN 2007, which can be found:
http://www.ualm.org.au/guest_editorials.php?guest_editorials=104
(** this source modified by myself so as to not copy and paste the entire letter as in original article)
(12) http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Lebanon%20S2007262.pdf (quotes from paragraphs 33, 37, 39, 42,
and 43)
(13) For an alternative perspective, see Franklin Lamb’s article “Who's Behind the Fighting in North Lebanon?” http://www.counterpunch.org/lamb05242007.html and Alberto Cruz’s article “The United States' new strategy in Lebanon: The secret war against Hizbollah” http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article17866.htm
(14) www.lorient-lejour.com.lb/page.aspx?page=article&id=348826 and
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/38E92305-2BC2-44F7-90D2-C08B07699F3E.htm
(15) https://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidDS020807_dsart31/SecMain/pagHomepage
(16) See footnote 1, item 7.
(17) Daily Star report at http://mybelovedlebanon.blogspot.com/2007/07/tashnag-throws-weight-behind-fpm-ahead.html
(18) https://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidDS020807_dsart31/SecMain/pagHomepage
(19) http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/eo/13441.pdf
(20) http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2007/08/gemayel_i_repre.php
(21) http://english.wa3ad.org/index.php?show=news&action=article&id=1329
(22) http://www.amin.org/look/amin/en.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=7&NrArticle=42143&NrIssue=1&NrSection=3
